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Although numerous scholars have attempted to explain and
justify the benefits provided to charities, none has been completely
successful. Their theories share, however, two required
characteristics for charities. First, charities must be distinct from
other types of entities in society, including governmental bodies,
businesses, other types of nonprofit organizations, and informal
entities such as families. Second, charities must provide some form
of public benefit. Focusing on these common characteristics reveals a
previously not fully appreciated role for the laws governing
charities: protecting charities from influences that could potentially
undermine these traits. Applying this new "autonomy perspective" to
the law governing charities reveals that while existing legal rules
generally protect charity autonomy, they fail to do so in one major
respect. Current law does not directly address the growing and often
negative influence of consumers who purchase services from
charities primarily for the consumers' own benefit and with little if
any regard to the public benefit charities must provide. Having
identified this vulnerability, this Article then samples the existing
empirical literature regarding fee-dependent charities to determine
under what conditions the influence of these consumers, whether
patients, students, retirement community residents, or others, is
likely to be detrimental to a charity's pursuit of public benefit, and
what options exist for addressing this influence. It concludes with
suggestions for further research that would help lawmakers
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INTRODUCTION
There is a perception among some academics,' government
officials, 2 and others3 that many charities may not be worthy of the
legal benefits that they enjoy. These critics have focused in particular
on charities that rely heavily on fees and engage in allegedly
noncharitable activities ranging from aggressive bill collection
practices 4 to the imposition of high and increasing charges, 5 as well as
1. See, e.g., ROB REICH ET AL., ANYTHING GOES: APPROVAL OF NONPROFIT STATUS BY THE
IRS 25-26 (2009) (noting how few 501(c)(3) applications are rejected as part of the IRS screening
process); Ray D. Madoff, What Leona Helmsley Can Teach Us About the Charitable Deduction, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 957, 958 (2010) (questioning whether wealthy individuals should receive
charitable tax deductions in a down economy).
2. See, e.g., Fred Stokeld, Becerra Says Exempt Organizations Must Police Themselves, 64
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 11 (2009) (reporting on comments by Representative Xavier Becerra that
tax-exempt organizations must do a better job policing themselves via increased transparency);
Senator Charles Grassley, Remarks on Charities and Governance at Buchanan, Ingersoll &
Rooney (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfmcustomeldata
PageID_1502=19725 (expressing a desire to make charities more accountable for tax breaks
given to them).
3. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat'l Comm. for Responsive Philanthropy, Independent Sector
Recommendations on Nonprofit Accountability Fall Seriously Short of Addressing the Critical
Issues Undermining Nonprofit Accountability and Trust (Apr. 4, 2005), available at
http://ncrp.orgnews-room/press-releases/430-independent-sector-recommendations-on-nonprofit-
accountability-fall-seriously-short-of-addressing-the-critical-issues-undermining-nonprofit-
accountability-and-trust (criticizing nonprofits for self-dealing, inappropriate expenditures, and
exorbitant trustee fees, among other issues).
4. See, e.g., Amanda W. Tahi, Note, Is Senator Grassley Our Savior?: The Crusade Against
"Charitable" Hospitals Attacking Patients for Unpaid Bills, 96 IOwA L. REV. 761, 770 (2011)
(describing debt collection by nonprofit hospitals via lawsuits, wage garnishments, and liens on
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generally the failure to provide sufficient public benefit. 6 Yet these
criticisms almost always fail to identify the underlying cause of the
questioned behaviors and, when they do identify the cause, they fail to
address it.
This Article seeks to remedy these concerns by identifying who
or what may be causing charities to pursue activities that do not
provide public benefit, rather than developing proposals to counter
specific practices. By focusing on the critical role of autonomy and
carefully considering the outside influences that impact charities, this
Article sheds fresh light on the current legal framework for charities.
This new autonomy perspective reveals that such laws serve in large
part to eliminate or restrict outside influence and so ensure that
charities provide significant public benefit. This analysis also reveals,
however, one significant gap in this protection: current law does not
generally limit the influence of self-seeking consumers who pay
charities for services. It is therefore the purchasers of these services-
patients of charity hospitals, students at nonprofit schools and their
parents, and others-who appear to be the primary force causing
charities that rely heavily on such purchasers to depart from
providing public benefit. To counter such departures therefore
requires reducing or counterbalancing this consumer influence.
Part I of this Article examines the theories of why charities
exist and enjoy significant legal benefits. It concludes that almost all
of the disparate rationales for the existence and support of charities
attribute two common characteristics to charities. First, charities are
distinct from entities in the other sectors of society and so perform
functions that will not be done, or not done as well, by those other
entities. Second, charities provide some form of significant public
benefit. Significant public benefit is required because the law not only
tolerates but in numerous ways supports charities at the cost of
real property as "predatory" and "aggressive"); Joseph Rhee, Health Care Bill Cracks Down on
Abuses by Charitable Hospitals, ABC NEWS, Mar. 25, 2010, http://abcnews.go.comifBotter/health-
care-bill-cracks-abuses-charitable-hospitals/story?id=10192810 (reporting that a Georgia
nonprofit hospital garnished the wages of a woman earning minimum wage to pay hospital bill).
5. See, e.g., Charles E. Grassley, Wealthy Colleges Must Make Themselves More Affordable,
54 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 30, 2008, at 36 (expressing concern that growing college
endowments and other resources are not used to decease ever-increasing tuition costs).
6. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, The Conundrum of Charitability: Reassessing Tax Exemption
for Hospitals, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 327, 375-76 (1990) (noting that the IRS uses community
benefit as the operative test for nonprofit tax designation of nonprofit hospitals even with
difficulties in measuring the intangible qualities that define community benefit); George A.
Nation III, Non-Profit Charitable Tax-Exempt Hospitals-Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: To
Increase Fairness and Enhance Competition in Health Care All Hospitals Should Be For-Profit
and Taxable, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 141 (2011) (arguing that most nonprofit hospitals do not provide a
public benefit equal to the tax benefit they receive).
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diverting funds from other activities. For charities to be charities (i.e.,
to have these two characteristics) the law must protect them from
other societal actors who intentionally or inadvertently would damage
or destroy these defining characteristics.
Part II analyzes the current laws specifically applicable to
charities from this new autonomy perspective. It finds that almost all
of these laws, even though enacted over many years and often with
little explanation, serve to limit the influence of individuals and
groups on charities when such influence would likely compromise the
ability of charities to fulfill their identified roles. This systematic
review of existing legal rules reveals, however, one major weakness.
Current law fails to protect fee-dependent charities from the collective
desires of their consumers, desires that often may prioritize enhancing
the consumers' private benefits over providing public benefit.
Part III explores this weakness. It begins by describing how
fees have become an increasingly important source of revenue,
especially for certain types of charities. This Part then samples the
existing empirical literature regarding fee-reliant charities to
determine how the resulting influence of consumers may be blunted or
even eliminated depending on market and other conditions. Relevant
market conditions may include imperfect consumer information, high
barriers to entry, and limited market size resulting in limited
competition. Other relevant conditions may include third parties with
legal or other authority over charities, such as accreditation bodies or
religious organizations. The Part concludes that the existing empirical
evidence strongly indicates that the presence of such factors, and
therefore the strength of consumer influence, is likely to vary
significantly not only between charities engaged in different types of
activities-for example, universities versus child care centers-but
also within charities engaged in the same type of activities-for
example, rural hospitals versus urban hospitals.
Using the available data, the final Part considers various
options for addressing this potential vulnerability. These options
range from draconian restrictions, such as denying charitable status
to organizations that charge more than nominal amounts for their
services, to more modest restrictions. It concludes that, given the
significant variation in the strength of consumer influence, there is no
one-size-fits-all solution. Rather, which of the various solutions is
most appropriate depends on careful consideration of the market
conditions and other factors that affect the extent to which consumer
demands are likely to pull a specific charity or a specific type of
charity away from providing a public benefit. This Part therefore
suggests criteria for deciding among the various options given the
[Vol. 65:1:51
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variability in conditions faced by charities that rely heavily on fees for
services for financial support. The Article concludes by suggesting
directions for further research drawing on this autonomy perspective.
1. THE ROLE OF CHARITIES
To understand the role of charities, it is first important to be
clear what we mean when we use the term "charity." The first Section
addresses that definitional issue. The next two Sections review the
theories that explain the existence of charities and the related theories
that justify the significant legal benefits enjoyed by charities in order
to develop a complete picture of the role of charities in our society.
A. What Is a Charity?
Sociologists and others who study how societies organize
themselves have identified four sectors of formal and informal
organizations. These four sectors are the market, the government,
families and other informal groupings, and nonprofit organizations. 7
The sectors are distinguished by their different characteristics-
voluntary versus involuntary, profit seeking versus mutual or public
benefit seeking, formal versus informal organization, and so on-and
their resulting roles or functions.8 Some organizations do not easily
fall within a single sector, and there are numerous boundary issues,
but the vast majority of organizations fall into one or the other of
these four areas.
Of these four sectors, the nonprofit sector is the most recent to
be identified, and, perhaps for that reason, it is the least well defined.9
The term "nonprofit" is itself misleading because many of the
organizations within this sector in fact produce profits, although
seeking profits is not their primary purpose. Even identifying a set of
7. See, e.g., LESTER M. SALAMON & HELMUT K. ANHEIER, THE EMERGING NONPROFIT
SECTOR: AN OVERVIEW 1-3 (1996) (contrasting a developing third, "nonprofit" sector with the
established market and state sectors); JON VAN TIL, GROWING CIVIL SOCIETY: FROM NONPROFIT
SECTOR TO THIRD SPACE 20-21 (2000) (describing the four sectors); John Simon et al., The
Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK 267, 284, 288 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (describing
the law's "border patrol function" in keeping nonprofits, and particularly charities, separate and
distinct from government and business).
8. See PETER FRUMKIN, ON BEING NONPROFIT: A CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY PRIMER 3-5
(2002) (noting that the structural features of nonprofits give them advantages that business and
government sectors cannot match); VAN TIL, supra note 7, at 18-28 (describing various criteria
used to categorize organizations).
9. See SALAMON & ANHEIER, supra note 7, at 3 (explaining that the nature and capabilities
of the nonprofit sector are not sufficiently understood).
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collective characteristics that distinguish this sector from the other
three has proven difficult.'0 It is not necessary, however, to clarify
further the definition of the nonprofit sector because the focus here is
not on the nonprofit sector as a whole but on a subset of that sector.
This Article will refer to that subset as "charities" and define
them based on the fact that they both fall within the nonprofit sector
and enjoy legal benefits that are not shared by other nonprofit
organizations, particularly the ability to claim federal income tax
exemption and to receive contributions that are deductible for federal
tax purposes." Eligibility for such legal benefits is critical because it is
this characteristic that gives the government the power and arguably
the right to place limits on the activities of these entities even with
respect to matters that the Constitution normally protects from
government regulation.
12
B. Theories Explaining the Existence of Charities
Having identified a set of organizations that are distinct from
governmental entities, businesses, and informal groups (e.g., families),
the following questions naturally arise: Why did this distinct set of
organizations come to exist, and why did legislators choose to create
legal regimes (e.g., nonprofit corporation laws) to accommodate their
existence? These questions are particularly important with respect to
10. See, e.g., FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 3 (expressing that defining the fundamental
features that all nonprofits share is "a complex and daunting task," but identifying three shared
characteristics: "(1) they do not coerce participation; (2) they operate without distributing profits
to shareholders; and (3) they exist without simple and clear lines of ownership and
accountability"); SALAMON & ANHEIER, supra note 7, at xvii-xviii (identifying five common
characteristics of nonprofits: "(a) formally constituted; (b) organizationally separate from
government; (c) non-profit-seeking; (d) self-governing; and (e) voluntary to some significant
degree").
11. See, e.g., MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40919,
AN OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND CHARITABLE SECTOR 2 (2009) (defming "charitable
organization" in this manner); Simon et al., supra note 7, at 268 (using "charity" in this manner).
12. Compare Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544-46 (1983)
(upholding as constitutional the charity lobbying limit because Congress has authority to restrict
the type of speech funded by the tax exemption and deductible contributions "subsidy"), with
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (rejecting the argument that
legal advantages granted to corporations generally are sufficient to permit laws prohibiting
corporate speech), and Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 646-50 (1819) (finding
a state legislative attempt to effectively take control of a nonprofit organization to be an
unconstitutional impairment of contract in large part because the organization was a private
institution that relied on funds provided by individuals, even though the organization enjoyed
the legal benefits of incorporation under state law). But see Evelyn Brody & John Tyler,
Respecting Foundation and Charity Autonomy: How Public is Private Philanthropy?, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 571, 599-600 (2010) (stating that federal tax benefits do not justify government
interference with most aspects of charity governance and activities).
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charities, for which the law does not merely provide accommodation
but also provides many benefits. Numerous scholars have attempted
to answer these questions, resulting in a plethora of theories, each of
which almost certainly provides a valid, but partial, explanation. 13
The most extensively developed set of theories uses what can be fairly
characterized as a demand-side economic approach, while other
theories follow a more supply-side, and often consciously noneconomic,
path.
14
The demand-side economic theories focus primarily on the
failures or limitations of the government and market sectors. With
respect to the government sector, Burton Weisbrod and others have
argued that governments will fail to provide certain collective goods
that society, or segments of society, desire because (1) the desired good
is unable to attract sufficient political support to cause the
government to provide it; (2) the bureaucratic nature of government
results in insufficient innovation and responsiveness, as well as
excessive administrative costs; or (3) the government is legally barred
from providing such goods.1 5 For example, governments may choose
not to fund research into a cure for a particular disease because those
who suffer from that disease are unable to muster sufficient political
support to secure such funding or are unwilling to accept the costs and
delays associated with obtaining and using such funding. Nonprofits,
including charities, can overcome these failures. Nonprofits do not
require the same level of public support as government action because
they have neither the level of bureaucratization that exists in
13. See JOHN COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 22-27 (1995)
(summarizing theories justifying tax treatments); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the
Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 514-28
(2010) (summarizing theories justifying tax treatments); Simon et al., supra note 7, at 273-75
(summarizing theories justifying tax treatments).
14. See FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 19-22 (dividing these theories into demand-side and
supply-side approaches).
15. See, e.g., Burton Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of a Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three
Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 21, 30 (1986); see also Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[T]he provision of
tax exemption to nonprofit groups is one indispensable means of limiting the influence of
governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community life."); Ilan Benshalom, The Dual
Subsidy Theory of Charitable Contributions, 84 IND. L.J. 1047, 1048-49 (2009) (focusing on the
countermajoritarian aspects of the charitable contribution deduction); Brian Galle, The Role of
Charity in a Federal System 1, 12-36 (FSU Coll. of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 394,
Law, Bus. & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-25, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3lpapers.cfm?abstractid=1473107 (challenging the conventional government-failure theories,
but introducing a new government-failure theory for subsidizing charities based on when
federalism mechanisms fail). See generally Richard Steinberg, Economic Theories of Nonprofit




government agencies nor the same legal restraints as governments
(most notably with respect to religious activities).
With respect to the market sector, Henry Hansmann and
others have argued that markets fail to produce desired goods or
services when faced with either a free-rider situation or a contract-
failure problem. 16 The former case arises when there is no cost-
effective way for the producer to charge some or all of the ultimate
beneficiaries. For example, art in a public location might create this
problem. A similar, if less extreme, situation exists where the
producer can charge the primary beneficiary for the good or service
but not secondary beneficiaries who enjoy positive externalities
generated by the good or service. For example, education is often cited
as such a service because educated individuals purportedly facilitate a
robust democracy and strong communities.
17
"Contract failure" arises when the producer can provide the
consumer with a substandard good or service that increases the
producer's profit, and there is no cost effective way for the consumer to
detect this behavior.18 One example of this is the provision of a
complicated service, such as health care, the quality and value of
which is difficult to judge accurately, particularly for nonrepeat
consumers.19 A recent example is the apparent preference for
16. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1393, 1397-98 (1988) (demonstrating the difficulty charities encounter regarding collective
goods); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 848-63
(1980) (describing the role nonprofits play in producing "public goods" for society); see also
COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 13, at 100-13 (developing a "donative theory" to support the
charity tax exemption and deductibility of charitable contributions, built on the government-
failure and market-failure theories); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax
Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419,
439 (1998) (proposing a "risk compensation theory" to support charity tax exemption, built on the
government- and market-failure theories). See generally Steinberg, supra note 15, at 117, 119-21
(describing these market-failure theories).
17. See SHERLOCK & GRAVELLE, supra note 11, at 36 ("For example, education is thought to
have positive externalities. Not only does the person receiving an education benefit, but educated
people are better equipped to participate in a functional democracy."); Richard Morrison, Price
Fixing Among Elite Colleges and University, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 807, 831 (1992) (listing
"heightened political participation, crime reduction, increased productivity, and increased
knowledge" (citations omitted) as some of the social benefits of education).
18. Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 506-
07 (1981).
19. See Femida Handy et al., The Discerning Consumer: Is Nonprofit Status a Factor?, 39
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 866, 878-79 (2010) (nonprofits are generally perceived as
more trustworthy than other types of entities by both potential supporters and customers); Mark
Schlesinger et al., Public Expectations of Nonprofit And For-Profit Ownership in American
Medicine, 23 HEALTH AFF. 181, 189 (2004) (concluding, based on a review of available surveys,
that a solid majority of the public believes nonprofit health care agencies are more trustworthy
[Vol. 65:1:51
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nonprofit organization providers in the charter school field.20 Another
example is the provision of benefits to children in distant countries,
where a thirty-dollar-a-month domestic "purchaser" of such benefits
has no cost-effective way to monitor the quality of the benefits
provided or even whether any benefits are provided at all. Nonprofits,
including charities, can generally overcome both of these failures
because they neither depend solely on payments from the beneficiaries
of their goods or services nor are they driven by a profit motive to
maximize net income.
There is no comparable set of economic or demand-side theories
for how nonprofits provide goods and services that families or other
informal organizations do not, but it is relatively easy to explain this
oversight. At least in the United States, the predominant informal
organizations are the family and the household (which often, but not
always, overlap), and they usually are organized and share economic
resources on a relatively small scale, thereby preventing them from
engaging in activities that require even a modest-sized organization.
21
It is therefore not surprising that proponents of these theories
generally ignore these groups-even though in some domestic
subcultures, families, households, and other informal groups are
organized on a larger scale. 22 That said, however, families and
households do tend to operate on a relatively small scale in the United
States and so are highly unlikely to have the financial and human-
capital resources needed to operate an even medium-sized or semi-
complicated activity, such as the activities engaged in by small
educational, health care, and social service institutions.
Expanding beyond goods and services, some commentators
argue that nonprofits also provide positive benefits to our democratic
political process.23 For example, nonprofits may generate ideas,
and cheaper, but also that they provide lower quality care and are less efficient, when compared
to for-profit owned health care providers).
20. See John Morley, Note, For-Profit and Nonprofit Charter Schools: An Agency Costs
Approach, 115 YALE L.J. 1782, 1797 (2006) (describing high monitoring costs groups face in
evaluating performance of charter schools).
21. See Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 254-61 (2006) (showing statistics that U.S. households usually are
small and consist of close, as opposed to extended, family members).
22. See, e.g., Ronald Lee, The Rom-Viach Gypsies and the Kris-Romani, 45 AM. J. COMP. L.
345 (1997) (describing the intricate, if informal, organization of Rom-Vlach Gypsies in Canada
and the United States, in which extended family ties play a critical role).
23. See, e.g., Miriam Galston, Civic Renewal and the Regulation of Nonprofits, 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POLVY 289. 294-324 (2004) (summarizing different "civic renewal" perspectives
regarding the role of voluntary associations); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
387, 404-08 (1998) (arguing that the charitable contribution deduction serves as a mechanism
for permitting taxpayers to choose the objects of government support); see also David Brennan, A
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information, and political input from various groups, especially
unrepresented or underrepresented ones. 24 The latter groups may
otherwise lack the ability to participate in the political process, and so
have a voice in government, because of a combination of historical and
resource issues. For similar reasons, charities may provide a different
perspective than either businesses that are driven by their bottom-line
concerns or governments controlled by political interests. 25 This
differing perspective not only enhances public debate but also can
serve to challenge otherwise dominant views promoted by those
entities that control political or economic power. Nonprofits generally
and charities specifically may also serve as an additional check on
government and market power and therefore fulfill an important
democratic role in holding governments and for-profit entities
accountable.
26
These political theories rest on both demand-side approaches
that focus on the inputs that a democratic political process needs, and
supply-side approaches, that develop an organizational form to
provide a means for certain typically underrepresented populations to
be heard in the public square. Supply-side approaches are not limited
to groups seeking political participation, however. For example,
Robert Atkinson has detailed how charities provide a vehicle for
individuals to fulfill their altruistic desires collectively in a way that
Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption, 4 PIr. TAX REV. 1, 3-4 (2006) (arguing that
charities as currently defined have a "normative rationale" of "contextual diversity" in addition
to solving market and government failures with respect to the provision of goods and services).
See generally Elisabeth S. Clemens, The Constitution of Citizens: Political Theories of Nonprofit
Organizations, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 207 (2d ed., Walter W.
Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2006) (summarizing various political theories on nonprofits'
impact on democracy and political/policy processes).
24. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294
(1981) ("By collective efforts individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their
voices would be faint or lost."); Elizabeth T. Boris, Introduction: Nonprofit Organizations in a
Democracy-Roles and Responsibilities, in NONPROFITS & GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION &
CONFLICT 1, 18 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2d ed. 2008) (summarizing
research that nonprofits provide "avenues of civic participation" in society); see also COMMISSION
ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, GIVING IN AMERICA: TOWARD A STRONGER
VOLUNTARY SECTOR 43-44 (1975) [hereinafter GIVING IN AMERICA] (asserting that charities can
"exercise a direct influence on shaping an advancing government policy" in numerous areas).
25. See GIVING IN AMERICA, supra note 24, at 42-43; Brennan, supra note 23, at 14-19;
(arguing that HMOs and physician assistant programs arose because of nonprofit involvement);
see also Keely Jones Stater, How Permeable is the Nonprofit Sector? Linking Resources, Demand,
and Government Provision to the Distribution of Organizations Across Nonprofit Mission-Based
Fields, 39 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 674, 688 (2010) (finding an increased diversity of
nonprofit organizations in more heterogeneous communities based on a nationwide study,
although also finding that other factors affect the level of nonprofit diversity).
26. See GIVING IN AMERICA, supra note 24, at 44-45 (arguing that nonprofits' roles in
"monitoring and influencing" government are growing increasingly important).
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they cannot achieve by acting individually. 27  Acting together
voluntarily for the perceived greater good can also satisfy needs for
community or fellowship that neither profit-seeking efforts in the
market nor the forced working together of government can satisfy,
thereby building social capital. While such supply-side motivations
could perhaps be at least partially satisfied absent a formal, nonprofit
organization outlet, the common argument of these theories is that the
nonprofit form is a better outlet for such desires than other available
vehicles, whether government agencies or for-profit, private entities.
Each of these various theories can be subject to criticisms, and
none of them fully explain the existence of nonprofits generally or
charities specifically. 28 The reality is that when the focus is tightened
to a specific type of charitable organization, often one theory provides
a more viable explanation than others. For example, the economic,
government-failure, and market-failure theories work best for
charities involved in the production of certain types of goods and
services that are particularly vulnerable to the identified government
and market limitations. 29 Similarly, the political theories have their
greatest strength with respect to advocacy and information-providing
organizations, such as civil rights groups and think tanks, but seem to
have little application to charities focused on the provision of specific
goods or services. Unique justifications also arguably exist for the
27. Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 505 (1990); see
also FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 21-24 (developing a supply-side, social-entrepreneur approach
and noting that nonprofits give citizens the group structure required to give individuals the
ability to affect change on local and national problems); GIVING IN AMERICA, supra note 24, at 46;
Paul J. DiMaggio & Helmut K. Anheier, The Sociology of Nonprofit Organizations and Sectors,
16 ANN. REV. SOC. 137, 140-41 (1990) (identifying such supply-side factors as well as
"institutional factors" such as "state policy, organizing norms, ideology and religion"); Usha
Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257 (2011) (the nonprofit form provides a vehicle
for creating a "warm-glow" identity).
28. See, e.g., COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 13, at 92-94 (summarizing criticisms of theories
explaining tax treatment of charities); Fleischer, supra note 13, at 529-36 (criticizing the
existing theories for not "adequately identify[ing] which projects merit subsidies"); Galle, supra
note 15, at 14-38 (criticizing the government-failure theories); Henry Hansmann, The Changing
Roles of Public, Private, and Nonprofit Enterprise in Education, Health Care, and Other Human
Services, in INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE,
AND LONG-TERM CARE IN AMERICA 245, 254-55, 269 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996) (questioning
whether consumers of health care and education are likely to be unsophisticated and poorly
informed such that they are vulnerable to information asymmetries as asserted by the contract-
failure theory).
29. Precisely which goods and services have this characteristic is the subject of much
debate. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, Why is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (and Other Mysteries of Tax
Exemption for Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 870 (1993) (arguing that
higher education is less of a market failure than commentators suggest).
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classification of religious organizations as charities, but those
justifications are beyond the scope of this Article.
30
There is, however, a common theme between all of the various
theories. What nonprofits do is something that cannot be done at all,
or done as well, by the other sectors because of the inherent
limitations of organizations in those sectors, whether that something
is producing a particular good or service or providing an outlet for a
particular individual or societal desire, such as altruism.3' Even
though these theories are, for the most part, descriptive instead of
normative, a normative question remains: Why are a subset of these
groups (i.e., charities) affirmatively given substantial benefits? The
next Section addresses the justifications for these extensive legal
benefits.
C. The Legal Benefits Enjoyed by Charities
This Section first describes the legal benefits that charities
enjoy and summarizes the theories that justify granting such benefits
to charities. It then explains why the concept of public benefit is the
critical justification for these benefits, a justification that goes beyond
the "nonprofits do it better" approach of most of the theories
previously described.
1. The Legal Benefits
Domestic law-federal, state, and local-grants significant
benefits to charities. 32 These benefits generally fall into two
categories. The first category is benefits that effectively reduce the
costs of obtaining inputs for a charity's activities. This includes not
only exemption from federal and usually state income taxes but also
the tax deduction for contributions, access to tax-exempt bond
financing, exemption from state and local taxes on real and personal
30. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" for Religious Institutions
Constitutionally Dependent on Benefits for Secular Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 805, 802-12 (2001)
(summarizing various theories as applied to religious institutions).
31. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College Athletics, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 109, 147 (2010) ("A common theme of virtually all these theories is that charities
supply some sort of good or service, or 'way of doing things,' that is not replicated in the private
market or by government.").
32. See generally Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit
Organizations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 85, 86-87 (1993) (summarizing the benefits that charities
receive from federal, state, and local governments); Memorandum from Erika Lunder et al.,
Cong. Research Serv., to J. Comm. on Tax'n re Non-Tax Benefits Provided to Orgs. Described in
IRC § 501(c)(3) (Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Lunder et al. Memo] (summarizing the statutes of
both the federal government and five states that confer legal benefits upon charities).
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property, and exemption from sales and use taxes on the purchase of
goods or services.33 Current estimates of the cost to the government of
the tax-related benefits alone are between $70 and $80 billion per
year.
34
The second category of benefits is partial or complete exclusion
from the application of many federal and state laws, including
securities laws, or other special accommodations. 35 While the reasons
behind these exemptions are generally less than clear because of
sparse or nonexistent legislative history, such exemptions appear to
primarily flow from a belief that charities by their nature are unlikely
to engage in the bad acts these laws seek to prevent and so are not the
proper subjects of the rules. 36 It is beyond the scope of this Article to
33. See I.R.C. §§ 103, 141(e)(1)(G), 145, 170(c)(2), 501(c)(3), 2055(a)(2), 2522(a)(2) (2006);
Facchina et al., supra note 32, at 99 (describing state income tax exemptions for charities); Janne
Gallagher, The Legal Structure of Property-Tax Exemption, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMYION FOR
CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD 3, 3-4 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002) (noting that all fifty
states and the District of Columbia exempt charities from property taxes, a practice based off of
traditional British practice, which was carried by colonists to America); Mark J. Cowan,
Nonprofits and the Sales and Use Tax, FLA. TAX REV. (forthcoming) (analyzing states'
applications of sales and use taxes amid increase in number of nonprofits); see also Volunteer
Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14501-14505 (2006) (granting limited liability protection for
charity volunteers); U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, MAILING STANDARDS OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL
SERVICE DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL § 703, available at http://pe.usps.com/text/dmm3OO/703.htm
(detailing lower postal rates for charities); Facchina et al., supra note 32, at 112-14 (same);
Lunder et al. Memo, supra note 32, at CRS-5 to -10, -16 to -20, -26 to -29, -36 to -37, -42 to -44, -
50 to-52 (listing federal and state laws making charities eligible to participate in certain
assistance programs or to receive property and nongrant money).
34. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE, BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 211 (2011) (estimating the total cost of the federal income
tax charitable contribution deduction for fiscal year 2010 at $41.9 billion and the exclusion of
interest on bonds for construction of hospitals and private nonprofit educational facilities at $5.9
billion); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG. ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2010-2014, at 45, 47, 48 (Comm. Print 2010) (estimating the
total cost of the federal income tax charitable contribution deduction for fiscal year 2010 at $40
billion); Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Two-
Edged Sword?, in NONPROFITS & GOVERNMENT, supra note 24, at 141, 149-51 (estimating the
value of federal and state income tax exemptions to charities at $10 billion annually in 2002 and
of property tax exemptions at between $10 and $20 billion annually).
35. See Facchina et al., supra note 32, at 105-12, 115-17, 119-20 (discussing nonprofit
organizations' limited exemptions from application of antitrust laws, securities laws, labor
regulation, and criminal liability); Lunder et al. Memo, supra note 32, at 2-5, 10-15, 20-26, 29-
35, 37-42, 44-50 (detailing exemptions for nonprofit organizations under federal law and the
state laws of California, Florida, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania).
36. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 16-17 (1991) (excluding charities from the reach of
laws limiting telephone solicitations on the basis that there was not sufficient evidence to
conclude that such calls from charities were unwanted or unexpected and that there were
potential constitutional issues raised by restricting such calls); H.R. REP. No. 86-1766, at 24, 28
(1960) (explaining the exemption for charities from federal unemployment tax by simply stating
that they are not engaged in activities for profit); H.R. REP. NO. 75-2161, at 1 (1938) (stating that
the partial exclusion of purchases by charitable and similar institutions from the Robinson-
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address whether that belief is correct, although it tends to fit with the
general view, discussed below, that charities, when properly
constrained by the law, will seek to provide a public benefit and so are
less likely to pursue questionable or harmful actions that are usually
motivated by a desire for private benefit.
2. Theories Justifying the Legal Benefits
Given the extent of indirect financial and other assistance
provided to charities another question arises: Why should this
particular subset of nonprofits require or deserve this assistance? One
set of "tax base" theories, developed by William Andrews, Boris
Bittker, and others, concludes that exemption and deductibility of
contributions are appropriate because a properly defined income tax
base would exclude from taxation both nonprofit net income and funds
contributed to charities. 37 There are, however, significant gaps in
these theories as their supporters have acknowledged and other
commentators have noted. 38 For example, these theories do not
explain the availability of the charitable contribution deduction for the
full value of appreciated property and may not explain the deduction
at all, in that such contributions are voluntary and unrelated to the
Patman Act relating to price discrimination is because "they are not operated for profit"); S. REP.
No. 75-1769, at 1 (1938) (stating that the partial exclusion of purchases by charitable and similar
institutions from the Robinson-Patman Act relating to price discrimination is because "they are
not operated for profit"); 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, at 63 (J. S.
Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar comps., 2001) (mentioning criticism of the exemption from the Act
for charitable institutions, but not providing any explanation for that exemption).
37. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309, 345-46 (1972) (discussing reasons why charitable contributions may rationally be
excluded from taxable personal consumption to support the argument that charitable deductions
can be seen as a refinement in the definition of what is taxed); Boris Bittker, Charitable
Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37, 38, 62-63 (1972)
(affirming the "propriety and vitality" of deductions for charitable contributions and proposing a
repeal of percentage limits, deductions for donations to charitable contributions as business
expenses, a minimum contribution amount for eligible deductions, and a reexamination of the
deductibility of fair market value of appreciated capital assets); Johnny Rex Buckles, The
Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contributions Deduction, 80 IND. L.J. 947, 952-53
(2005) (arguing that the charitable contributions deduction can be defended as part of
"community income," an income which is properly excluded from the personal income tax base).
38. See, e.g., COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 13, at 24 (highlighting the problems with
accepting a tax-base theory as an explanation of the entire scope of charitable exemption);
Andrews, supra note 37, at 371-72 (challenging the justification for charitable contribution
deductions in cases of wealthy taxpayers with accumulated wealth or unearned income); Daniel
Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283 (2011) (utilizing
a subsidy theory to consider the appropriateness of the exemption's application to a charity's
investment income).
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production of income, so it is unclear why they should not be
considered (taxable) consumption even under a tax base approach.
39
A more comprehensive set of "subsidy" theories focuses on the
relative disadvantages charities face in obtaining financial support as
compared to groups in the other sectors and other nonprofit
organizations. Charities share with all other private entities the
inability to compel financial support (i.e., to tax). Unlike businesses,
however, charities are also unable to access the equity markets
because of the "nondistribution constraint"-the prohibition on having
owners with a right to distributions of profits.
40
Charities also differ from other types of nonprofit organizations
and families because they do not have a strong ability to convince
their members to support their activities financially. Noncharitable
nonprofit organizations are generally "mutual benefit" nonprofits that
exist primarily to serve their members. 41 Common examples of such
nonprofits include labor unions, trade associations, chambers of
commerce, professional associations, country clubs, and homeowners
associations. As explained by Mancur Olson, such groups can attract
financial support from their members by offering benefits to
participants-that is, to members-which are not available to
nonparticipants. 42 For example, the American Bar Association offers
39. See Andrews, supra note 37, at 371-72 (describing how the law allows a deduction for
the fair market value of appreciated capital assets without taking into account unrealized gains
by that value exceeding the taxpayer's basis); Paul R. McDaniel, Study of Federal Matching
Grants for Charitable Contributions, in IV COMM'N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUB. NEEDS,
RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED 2417, 2422-23 (1977) [hereinafter RESEARCH PAPERS] (detailing
the tension between theoretical perspectives of the deduction system-theories which rationalize
deductions for voluntary contributions as rewarding sacrifices to the public good or incentivizing
"consumption spending").
40. See Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 72-75 (1981) (justifying tax exemptions for
nonprofits, in part, because nonprofit organizations lack access to equity capital and must rely on
debt, donations, and retained earnings to raise capital).
41. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 17.07 (1987) (dividing nonprofit
corporations into public benefit, mutual benefit, and religious corporations, with mutual benefit
being the residual category); see also CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5059-5061 (West 1990) (dividing
nonprofit corporations into "mutual benefit," "public benefit," and "religious" categories); N.Y.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201 (McKinney 2005) (dividing nonprofit corporations into
categories based on purpose). But see MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 1.40 cmt. 3 (3d ed. 2008)
(noting the decision to abandon this formal division in the most recent edition of the model
nonprofit corporation act).
42. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 133 (1965). Some of these organizations, particularly labor unions, also may
be able to force potential free riders to become supporters through the operation of law. See 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006) (permitting an employer to agree with a labor organization to require
membership in the organization as a condition of employment, subject to certain conditions);
OLSON, supra, at 136-37 (noting that labor unions began to prosper only after employers had the
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its members access to various group insurance products that they
otherwise could not access. Some nonprofits, however, are not able to
identify or enlist their potential beneficiaries because the benefits are
too diffuse to trace to particular recipients or the benefit to any
particular beneficiary is too small to make offering such incentives
practical, resulting in what could be termed "membership failure."
Recent evidence indicates that even religious organizations are
vulnerable to this membership failure, as they appear to have at best
a relatively limited ability to convince their members to provide
financial support.43 For families, both legal pressures (such as child
welfare laws and child support obligations in the event of divorce) and
social pressures exist to motivate members to contribute to the well-
being of the group, and it is difficult for family members to "opt out" of
those obligations.
But resting the additional legal benefits that charities enjoy on
this apparent financial disadvantage as compared not only to
government and businesses, but also to mutual benefit nonprofits and
families, has two significant flaws. First, it is far from clear that this
financial disadvantage is significant enough to justify the magnitude
of the financial assistance provided by these benefits. 44 Second and
more fundamentally, it is not clear why charities should be placed on
the same financial footing as these other entities.4 5 Moreover, given
the difficulty of even identifying which goods or services are more
efficiently provided by nonprofits, as opposed to government or
businesses, it is an even further leap to assume that nonprofits
provide a given subset of those goods and services so much more
efficiently that it justifies the existing subsidies for charities. Together
these flaws suggest there should be some additional justification for
the indirect financial support provided through the broad range of
power to force workers to join the union). But see 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2006) (permitting states and
territories to prohibit such agreements).
43. See CHRISTIAN SMITH & MICHAEL 0. EMERSON, PASSING THE PLATE: WHY AMERICAN
CHRISTIANS DON'T GIVE AWAY MORE MONEY 36-37 (2008) (citing a 1998 General Social Survey
which illustrates that the median U.S. Christian giver donated only two hundred dollars to all
charities, including their church, that nearly half of regular churchgoers gave less than two
percent of their incomes, and that less than ten percent tithed).
44. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (estimating that in the aggregate, such
benefits are worth tens of billions of dollars annually); see also Daniel Shaviro, Assessing the
"Contract Failure" Explanation for Nonprofit Organizations and Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1997) (arguing that the nondistribution constraint may not in
fact result in reduced "investment" in nonprofit organizations).
45. Even if the financial disadvantages summarized above are not only real but substantial,
their effect-absent the indirect financial assistance charities enjoy-would presumably be to
limit, but not extinguish charities.
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legal benefits that charities generally enjoy. This additional
justification is found in the concept of "public benefit."
3. The Key Requirement: Public Benefit
This public benefit theory is an alternative explanation-not
merely an implementation of previously described theories-for why
charities are given unique legal status. This can be shown by a few
examples. With respect to the demand-side theories, the mere fact
that an organization can garner some modest measure of public
support and is not burdened with the bureaucracy inherent in most
government entities does not inherently prevent such an organization
from serving a relatively small, distinct group for its own benefit,
whether that group be lawyers, businesses in a particular industry, or
workers for a particular employer. Similarly, the mere fact that
information asymmetries with respect to a given service may exist
does not inherently require that this service provide a benefit to the
diffuse public. For example, the quality of legal services would appear
to be as difficult to judge for the nonrepeat user as education or
hospital care, and yet unlike these latter two services it has never
been suggested that the provision of legal services provides public
benefit such that an organization could qualify as a charity solely on
the basis of providing these services.
46
It is true that some of the sector-based theories-particularly
the impossible or difficult to capture externality market-failure
explanation 47-inherently require public benefit. But, as already
noted, these theories do not necessarily fit well with all of the actual
examples of organizations long-considered charitable. For example,
the coexistence of for-profit entities in some areas where charities are
active, such as health care, retirement communities, child care, and
increasingly education, suggests that the externality problem is not
insurmountable, at least in some situations. As for the supply-side
altruism, social entrepreneur, and similar theories, they do not
depend on differentiation from organizations in the other sectors but
instead explicitly rely on some type of public benefit being provided,
although under each theory the specifics of what qualifies as a public-
benefit-providing activity is left to private parties, not the
government, as long as such activities further one or more broadly
46. See Shaviro, supra note 44, at 1002-03 (examining why there are nonprofits in fields
such as charity work but not in automobile repair).
47. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing variations on government-
failure and market-failure theories).
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defined purposes. Finally, proponents of the political theories
generally view providing representation for underrepresented groups
or for a viewpoint distinct from that of market and government actors
to be inherently beneficial to society.
The law, both historically and currently, has embraced this
public benefit requirement.48 While there have been various attempts
to assert a different, usually narrower, basis for distinguishing
charities from other types of organizations, none of these attempts
have gained much traction. 49 The bottom line is therefore that this
public benefit aspect of charities has become the defining
characteristic separating them from other types of nonprofits. 50
Intuitively, this requirement of providing significant public benefit in
order to qualify for the legal benefits charities enjoy makes sense, as it
essentially requires that charities provide some positive, although
perhaps difficult to quantify, return to the public in exchange for those
benefits as opposed to simply offering up the possibility that they may
be more efficient in producing certain goods and services. Even with
48. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) ("Charitable exemptions
are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit .... ); Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (2010) (stipulating that an organization is not a charity "unless it serves a
public rather than a private interest"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 cmt. a (1959)
(citing the Preamble to the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses and stating that "[tihe common
element of all charitable purposes is that they are designed to accomplish objects which are
beneficial to the community"); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 321 (rev. 2d ed. 1992) (describing how "social benefit" was the
common theme in the Preamble to the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses); GARETH JONES,
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY 1532-1827, at 27 (1969) (emphasizing that public benefit was
they "key" to the Statute of Charitable Uses); John P. Persons et al., Criteria for Exemption
Under Section 501(c)(3), in RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 39, at 1909, 1909 (tracing the concept
of "charity" in IRC § 501(c)(3) to the Preamble). But see Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 608 (Powell,
J., concurring) ("I am unconvinced that the critical question in determining tax-exempt status is
whether an individual organization provides a clear 'public benefit' as defined by the Court.").
49. See, e.g., KERRY O'HALLORAN, CHARITY LAW AND SOCIAL INCLUSION: AN INTERNATIONAL
STUDY 1 (2007) (identifying the alleviation of poverty and the encouragement of social inclusion
more generally as being the central mission for charities); Fleischer, supra note 13, at 537
(arguing that a fuller understanding of charitable tax subsidies requires a distributive justice
analysis to address the "goodness" of various charities); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the
Good with the Bad: Recognizing the Negative Externalities Created by Charities and Their
Implications for the Charitable Deduction, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 1025-26 (2010) (proposing that
organizations that produce positive externalities should only qualify as charities if they also do
not produce serious negative externalities, such as those caused by exclusion policies and the
promotion of opposing viewpoints on issues upon which there is reasonable disagreement); Rob
Reich, Philanthropy and Its Uneasy Relation to Equality, in TAKING PHILANTHROPY SERIOUSLY:
BEYOND NOBLE INTENTIONS TO RESPONSIBLE GIVING 27, 28-29 (William Damon & Susan
Verducci eds., 2006) (proposing that philanthropy may, in fact, worsen inequality, but that
charities should not worsen social inequalities and should encourage greater equality).
50. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law's Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 7-13
(2011) (concluding that an other-regarding orientation is an essential legal characteristic of
charities that distinguishes them from other types of organizations),
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this requirement, however, we are still left with the difficult task of
defining "public benefit." Currently, federal tax law provides only a
broad and vague definition. 5' The next Part explores why such a
definition reflects a necessary balancing of the two aspects of the role
of charities-providing significant public benefit yet at the same time
escaping the limitations that the other sectors and mutual benefit
nonprofits face.
II. AUTONOMY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
Even though the nonprofit sector is often referred to as the
"independent" sector, it has always been subject to a variety of
influences. 52 For example, historically many nonprofit organizations,
including charities, have had close financial and other ties to
governments, although they have often struggled with the conditions
that come with those ties.53 Similarly, most charities rely on the
market as the primary source of the goods and services that they use,
and many charities rely heavily on fees paid by consumers, borrowed
funds from lenders, and contributions from wealthy donors. The
question is therefore not one of absolute independence from
governments, market actors, and other groups and private
individuals-something charities do not now enjoy and have never
enjoyed. Instead, the question is as follows: In what specific respects
51. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the laws that limit charitable purposes).
52. See Frank Annunziata, Introduction to the Transaction Edition, in RICHARD C.
CORNUELLE, RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ROLE OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS, at ix, ix (1993) (attributing the term "independent sector" to the 1965
edition of the book); PETER DOBKIN HALL, "INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR" AND OTHER
ESSAYS ON PHILANTHROPY, VOLUNTARISM, AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 79 (1992) (describing
the creation of the group "Independent Sector" to provide leadership for the nonprofit sector).
53. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549-50 (2001) (discussing a
successful challenge to federal rules prohibiting recipients of certain federal funds from attacking
the constitutionality of welfare laws, even if they used nonfederal funds to support such attacks);
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196-97 (1991) (discussing an unsuccessful challenge to federal
regulations requiring recipients of certain federal funds to avoid abortion-related activities
unless such activities were carried on in separate facilities, by separate personnel, supported by
nonfederal funds); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 558-74 (1819) (discussing a
successful challenge to what was effectively an attempted state legislative takeover of
Dartmouth College); Mark D. McGarvie, The Dartmouth College Case and the Legal Design of
Civil Society, in CHARITY, PHILANTHROPY, AND CIVILITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 91, 91 (Lawrence
J. Freidman & Mark D. McGarvie eds., 2003) (relating the Governor of New Hampshire's efforts
to secularize Dartmouth College and discussing the transitory role of American churches in
public service); Amy E. Moody, Conditional Federal Grants: Can the Government Undercut
Lobbying by Nonprofits Through Conditions Placed on Federal Grants?, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 113, 137-48 (1996) (discussing the effects and implications of the Simpson Amendment and
versions I and II of the Istook Amendments on the distribution of federal funds to nonprofits).
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do charities need to be autonomous from these external influences in
order to fulfill their identified role in society?
"Autonomy," as that term is used here, refers primarily to what
is commonly identified as negative liberty-that is, freedom from
external interference. 54 The reason for focusing on negative liberty is
that even absent the legal benefits provided to charities, sufficient
government support in the form of available legal forms and other
legal rules exists for current-day charities to persist, albeit with
lowered financial support and so probably reduced numbers and
activities. The existing legal benefits that charities enjoy but other
nonprofits do not enjoy are therefore not necessary for charities either
to exist or to exercise choice with respect to their activities. Nor is
there serious debate (at least in the United States) about the general
right of individuals to form voluntary associations with the ability to
make charitable choices, although such debates have arisen in certain
limited contexts.55 At the same time, as the following discussion will
make clear, charities require some level of interdependence with other
groups and individuals to be able to exercise such choices. 56 The key
issue raised by this new autonomy perspective for examining the legal
rules governing charities is therefore the balance of autonomy versus
dependence that best fits the societal role of charities (i.e., the
appropriate limits of charity autonomy).
This justification for charity autonomy does not rest on an
assertion that either nonprofits generally or charities particularly
should be viewed as separate "sovereigns" or otherwise have an
54. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 880-81
(1994) (asserting that one associates autonomy with negative liberty or positive liberty and that
negative libertarians assume adults have the capacity to lead autonomous lives and do so in the
absence of extraordinary interferences). I am therefore not focusing on positive liberty, that is,
what government can or should do to empower individuals--or, in this case, institutions-to
make choices. See id. at 883-84. (discussing positive libertarian conceptions of liberty and how
these conceptions of autonomy emphasize that autonomy requires self-awareness, self-control,
and self-governance).
55. See Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010) (concluding that a
public university may condition official recognition for a student group on that group not
discriminating in choosing its leadership); N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1,
11-12 (1988) (concluding that given the characteristics of the private clubs and associations at
issue, the Constitution permitted a state to prohibit certain types of discrimination by such
organizations); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983)
(concluding that the government's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education
outweighed the free-exercise-of-religion burden imposed on racially discriminatory religious
schools by the denial of charity status for such schools).
56. See Brett G. Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217,
1253-58 (describing an "inter-independence" conception of autonomy that walks a middle road




intrinsic right to be left alone, particularly by the government. 57 Nor
does this justification rest on an asserted constitutional right of
charities to autonomy, which would not be supported by existing case
law under any conditions. 58  Whatever strength these other
justifications may have, the justification relied upon here is this:
because the reason for providing extensive benefits to charities is their
two-fold role as actors distinct from governments, markets, families,
and mutual benefit nonprofits and as providers of public benefit,
however defined, a certain measure of autonomy is required. Without
the autonomy described in this Part, including autonomy from
government regulation, charities would in fact have a significantly
weaker case for claiming those benefits because they would lose their
distinctive, subsidy-deserving role.
Returning to the four-sector model, considerations of autonomy
can be divided by the influence of the actors in the four sectors:
government entities and officials; other actors in the nonprofit sector,
including beneficiaries, donors, and mutual benefit nonprofit
organizations; families; and market actors, including capital investors,
lenders, sellers of goods and services, and, finally, purchasers of goods
and services. This Part briefly summarizes the current laws with
respect to each of these groups and then analyzes these laws from this
new autonomy perspective to determine if the existing legal rules are
in fact adequately protecting charity autonomy. This analysis reveals
that, for the most part, existing laws respect this need for autonomy
by limiting or even barring the influence of such groups, but only to
the extent needed to prevent these groups from undermining the two
fundamental characteristics of charities. It also reveals, however, one
major weakness (as well as several more minor flaws) in current laws
57. See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax
Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 588-89 (1998) (exploring whether current law inherently reflects
a sovereign view of charity); Zelinsky, supra note 30, at 806-07 (exploring whether the
constitutionality of extending benefits to religious institutions is dependent upon the extension of
benefits to secular organizations); see also Lael Daniel Weinberger, The Business Judgment Rule
and Sphere Sovereignty, 27 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 279, 281-82 (2010) (applying the concept of
sphere sovereignty as a paradigm for understanding why the business judgment rule exists).
58. See supra note 12 (comparing Congress's ability to restrict speech funded by tax
exemptions with impermissible laws prohibiting corporate speech). But see Richard W. Garnett,
The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1841, 1882-83 (2001) (concluding that current constitutional case law generally protects
expression through associations from government control); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the
Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137,
1208-10 (2009) (arguing that current constitutional law should be extended to protect houses of
worship from government interference with internal communications even given that houses of
worship receive tax benefits as charities).
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that should be remedied to ensure the proper degree of charity
autonomy.
A. Autonomy with Respect to Governments
Government entities and officials interact with charities in
three general ways: (1) general regulation of charities tied to the
provision of the legal benefits previously described; (2) advocacy,
lobbying, and election-related activities by charities to influence
government policy and personnel; and (3) government funding of
charities. While other forms of interaction exist, such as funding of
government entities by charities and collaborations between charities
and governments, these other ways either pose little risk of
government influence over charities (in the case of a charity funding a
government entity) or represent a variation on one of these three
general categories. 59 This Section first discusses the laws that limit
charitable purposes and therefore activities, as opposed to laws that
limit the influence of other private parties, which will be discussed in
later sections. It then discusses the relative lack of government
regulation relating to the internal affairs of charities; the limits on
advocacy, lobbying, and election-related activities of charities; and,
finally, government funding of charities.
1. Limits on Permitted Purposes
The most obvious way that government entities and officials
influence the activities of charities under current law is by limiting
the purposes that charities may further. The starting place for these
limits is the definition found in the federal tax law section granting
charities exemption from income tax. This definition, which follows, is
also mirrored in other tax provisions benefitting charities:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or
equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals .... 60
59. For example, collaboration usually means sharing government resources with a charity
(i.e., a form of government funding) or working together to form government policy (i.e., a form of
advocacy or lobbying).
60. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); see also id. § 170(c)(2)(B) (relating to the deductibility of
contributions for income tax purposes); id. § 2055(a)(2) (relating to the exclusion of such
contributions from taxable estates); id. § 2522(a)(2) (relating to the exclusion of such
contributions from taxable gifts).
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A broad range of purposes fall within these statutory terms,
particularly "charitable," "educational," and "religious." 61 The limits on
such purposes are few and consist of prohibitions on promoting illegal
activity, acting contrary to clearly established public policy, and, in
the education context, promoting irrational and unsupported (even by
coherent argument) views.
62
Consistent with an autonomy perspective, the justification for
the breadth of the definitions and the few limits that exist is found in
the dual role of charities previously identified in this Article. All the
theories explaining the existence of nonprofits generally and charities
more specifically focus on the distinctive nature of nonprofits as
compared to other types of entities and so focus on a nonprofit
organization's ability to avoid the weaknesses of those other entities.
63
What all of these theories-and academics and policymakers trying to
apply them-have difficulty doing, however, is concretely identifying
what specific goods, services, or activities are best done by charities.
64
61. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2010) (defining "charitable" to include not only
relieving "the poor and distressed or ... the underprivileged" but also combating community
deterioration and juvenile delinquency, defending human and civil rights, eliminating prejudice
and discrimination, erecting or maintaining public buildings or works, and lessening the burdens
of government more generally, as well as "advanc[ing]" education, religion, or science); id. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i)(a), (b) (defining "educational" to include not only schooling in a formal
institution but also more broadly "instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of
improving or developing his capabilities," and "instruction of the public on subjects useful to the
individual and beneficial to the community"); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GUIDE FOR
CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 27 (2009), available at http:lwww.irs.govlpub/irs-
pdf/pl828.pdf ("The IRS makes no attempt to evaluate the content of whatever doctrine a
particular organization claims is religious, provided the particular beliefs of the organization are
truly and sincerely held by those professing them.").
62. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (denying tax-exempt
status for a racially discriminatory admissions policy because the university was acting contrary
to clearly established public policy); Nat'l Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868, 873-74 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (upholding denial of charity status because of the organization's failure to provide a
sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts in its "educational" material);
Nationalist Movement v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 558, 591-94 (1994) (applying the test contained in
Revenue Procedure to conclude that petitioner's newsletter was not in furtherance of an
educational purpose), aff'd on other grounds, 37 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1994); Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (2010) (requiring a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts
to qualify as "educational"); Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729 (outlining criteria used by the
Internal Revenue Service to determine the circumstances under which an organization is
considered "educationar'); Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204 (denying tax-exempt status to
organizations that promote illegal activity).
63. As previously noted, these weaknesses include the inability to overcome significant free-
riding issues, contract failure, political-will failure, bureaucratic failure, and/or membership
failure. See supra Part I.B.
64. See, e.g., Richard Schmalbeck, Reforming Uneven Subsidies in the Charitable Sector, 66
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 237, 237-38 (2010) (acknowledging the difficulty of comparing the
relative worthiness of existing charitable purposes).
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The government-failure economic theories identify nonprofits
as entities able to avoid a lack of majoritarian (or sufficiently coherent
and influential minoritarian) will, the bureaucratization that is
usually inherent in government activities, and the legal constraints
faced by the government.6 5 The difficulty of the government itself
identifying and limiting charities to politically chosen activities, as
opposed to activities chosen by charity entrepreneurs, donors, and
consumers, is self-evident-although Brian Galle has argued that this
problem is overstated.6 6 The limited ability of government to dictate
what a charity may do in the areas where government itself is
constrained, particularly with respect to religious activities, is also
fairly obvious. As for the activities beset by bureaucratization, there is
evidence that the government can and does tend to crowd charities out
of areas when it determines that, even with its bureaucratic
limitations, it is the best direct provider of certain goods or services.
67
However, by giving charities the freedom to still operate in these
areas, most prominently in education, that determination is subject to
constant testing to ensure it is correct, thereby avoiding the political
will failure potential.
The market-failure economic theories identify nonprofits as
entities able to overcome significant free-rider issues by attracting
gratuitous support from donors and volunteers. They also identify
nonprofits as able to overcome contract failure issues because donors
and consumers perceive nonprofits as providing difficult-to-evaluate
goods and services more reliably than profit-seeking entities. Yet
scholars have found it difficult to identify what specific types of
activities fall into each of these categories at any given moment.
68
Moreover, the list of these activities almost certainly changes over
time as new ways of preventing free riding and evaluating the quality
of goods and services emerge. For example, while public television and
65. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
66. See Galle, supra note 15, at 37-38 (arguing that government is more "reflective of
contemporary preferences than is [private] charity, is better able to deliberate between
competing goals, and in general is no less capable of enacting them").
67. See Jonathan Gruber & Daniel Hungerman, Faith-Based Charity and Crowd Out
During the Great Depression, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 1043, 1045 (2007) (study suggesting that New
Deal spending resulted in a thirty percent reduction in church spending on social services). But
see Richard Steinberg, Does Government Spending Crowd Out Donations?, 62 ANNALS PUB. &
CO-OPERATIVE ECON. 591, 604 (1991) (concluding that no clear pattern is discernable in crowding
out studies involving different goods and services); infra note 99 (citing studies indicating that
government funding of nonprofits has no clear effect on private donations).
68. See, e.g., COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 13, at 108-09 (proposing a donative-theory
approach to resolve this problem); Fleischer, supra note 13, at 531; Hansmann, supra note 16, at
862-68 (considering various types of complex personal services).
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radio used to be the classic examples of significant free riding, the
emergence of pay television and radio appears to have changed that
categorization. At the same time, there is an ongoing debate regarding
whether readily available free news makes journalistic outlets,
particularly newspapers, increasingly subject to a free-rider problem
such that they should now be able to qualify as charities. 69 Similarly,
it is arguable that the growing availability of consumer-orientated
information about the quality of health care, as well as the role of
insurance companies in screening health care providers, sufficiently
informs even single-use consumers so that they can determine which
providers give the best care. Both of these factors suggest that any
attempt by the government to specifically limit the activities of
charities based on these theories would be ill-advised, even assuming
concerns about the political process (addressed below) are negligible. If
it is difficult to identify activities that truly generate substantial,
difficult-to-capture externalities (i.e., public benefit), then it may make
more sense to leave such identification to donors, volunteers, and
charity entrepreneurs that pursue such activities as opposed to the
government. 7° Furthermore, if such activities change over time it may
be best not to codify a specific list of such activities, even if it could be
done accurately at a given moment in time, and risk such restrictions
quickly becoming obsolete.
The political theories justifying the existence of and support of
nonprofits-particularly charities-inherently require that the
individual citizens who found, manage, and support those charities
(instead of the government) determine what activities to pursue.71 The
strength of such theories might be relatively low with respect to
charities that primarily or exclusively provide goods or services. But
for charities concerned with public policy research and advocacy,
having the government limit the subjects considered and the
viewpoints asserted in the interest of ensuring "public benefit" would
69. See, e.g., Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Can Nonprofits Save Journalism? Legal
Constraints and Opportunities, 65 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 463 (2010) (arguing that newspaper
publishing is now unprofitable and thus should be granted nonprofit status); Richard
Schmalbeck, Financing the American Newspaper in the Twenty-first Century, 35 VT. L. REV. 251,
251 (2010) (arguing that the declining circulation and advertising revenue can be solved by
changing the financial structure of journalistic output); Nick Gamse, Note, Legal Remedies for
Saving Public Interest Journalism in America, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 329, 359 (2011) (arguing that
a nonprofit tax subsidy would ensure that newspapers survive in the new economy).
70. See Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REV. 433,
463-64 (1996) ('Many activities have, in various times and various places, been provided within
various spheres of conduct: the family, the church, the government, the proprietary sector and
private community organizations.").
71. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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defy the rationale of these theories. Such government action would
also possibly be constitutionally suspect. Indeed, these theories
explicitly or implicitly assume that a broad range of viewpoints itself
provides a public benefit. Similarly, the supply-side theories relating
to altruism and social entrepreneurs also rest heavily on charity
activities being set by the individual participants and not the political
process. 72
Does that mean that there is no justification for even the
existing broad and vague limitations found in federal tax law and
most state law counterparts? The answer is no for at least three
reasons. First, certain purposes, such as promoting illegal activity,
clearly cause significant public harm and so are antithetical to
providing public benefit under any plausible definition of that term.
73
Such identified public harm purposes (and activities) are currently
strictly limited, however. While there have been various proposals to
impose broader limits based on this rationale, doing so would once
again raise the specter of eliminating one of the primary distinctions
charities enjoy vis-A-vis government.
74
Second, just because more refined limitations are difficult if not
impossible to identify does not mean that the existing limitations are
without merit. The current limitations have the weight of history
behind them-dating from the seventeenth century, if not earlier-
and existing empirical data to support the view that they are
compatible with the role of nonprofits, and particularly charities, in
society. For example, despite the much-reported move of for-profit
entities into traditionally charitable areas, such as hospital care and
education, the reality is that the vast majority of hospital beds
(seventy percent) and, among private providers of higher education,
students (sixty percent) are still found within nonprofits.
75
72. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., McCormack, supra note 49; Nicholas A. Mirkay, Is It "Charitable" to
Discriminate? The Necessary Transformation of Section 501(c)(?) into the Gold Standard for
Charities, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 45, 105-06 (arguing that a broader definition of "charitable" is
necessary to prevent discriminatory practices in charitable organizations).
75. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE
MARKETPLACE ex. 5.4 (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7031/print-sec5.cfm
(showing that not-for-profit ownership of community hospital beds remained between sixty-nine
percent and seventy-one percent from 1980 through 2003); NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2009, at 279 (2010) (showing an increasing
percentage of higher education students attending for-profit institutions from fall 1967 through
fall 2008, although absolute enrollment at not-for-profit higher education institutions also
increased significantly during this period); see also Mark Schlesinger & Bradford H. Gray,
Nonprofit Organizations and Health Care: Some Paradoxes of Persistent Scrutiny, in THE
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Interestingly, it also appears that if a particular area-for example,
hospitals in particular markets or student loans more generally-no
longer has sufficient market-failure problems to prevent for-profit
businesses from entering, investors appear to move successfully into
that area and displace charities, although not always without negative
consequences. 76 Similarly, the government may be able to occupy roles
previously held by charities if it overcomes its political will and
bureaucratic limitations and then chooses to fulfill those roles directly
(as opposed to through merely providing funding to existing
nonprofits).77 While neither mechanism is perfect, and more research
needs to be done regarding how and to what extent governments and
businesses effectively police these boundaries by entering or
abandoning various areas of activity, the existing data suggest that
both the market sector and the public sector may be capable of
realigning the boundaries of the charitable sector without explicit
legal changes to those boundaries. 7
8
Third and most importantly, certain purposes may provide only
incidental benefit to the larger community as opposed to providing
benefits to market-rate-paying consumers. While exactly which
purposes have "non-incidental' public benefit is a subject of much
debate, a couple of examples illustrate how the law currently draws
this line. As noted previously, there would appear to be as strong an
argument for contract failure with respect to the provision of legal
services as there is for other hard-to-judge services, such as education.
Yet, providing the former is not considered an inherently charitable
activity while providing the latter is, apparently because of the
perception (whether correct or not) that the latter provides a more-
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 378, 381 (describing for-profit
market share across a variety of health services, including acute care hospitals).
76. See, e.g., Guy David, The Convergence Between For-profit and Nonprofit Hospitals in the
United States, 9 INT'L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. ECON. 403, 408-09 (2009) (suggesting that hospitals
may effectively choose between nonprofit and for-profit status depending on the changing
economic and regulatory environment in which they operate); Eric C. Hallstrom, Note, Here We
Go Again-The Conversion of Qualified Scholarship Funding Corporations from Nonprofit to
For-profit Status, 25 J. CORP. L. 659, 665-67 (2000) (describing the transfer of student loan
activities from charities to for-profits); see also John H. Goddeeris & Burton A. Weisbrod,
Conversion From Nonprofit to For-profit Legal Status: Why Does It Happen and Should Anyone
Care?, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR 129, 130-31 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998) (describing the transfer of health-
maintenance and health-insurance activities from nonprofit, but not necessarily charitable,
organizations to for-profit entities).
77. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
78. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruistic Nonprofit Firms in Competitive Markets: The Case
of Day-Care Centers in the United States, 9 J. CONSUMER POLy 291, 293 (1986) (explaining
reasons why charities and for-profit entities might coexist in the same market).
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than-incidental public benefit in addition to benefitting the fee-paying
consumers. 79 While the provision of legal services may qualify as
charitable, it only does so either when provided to those who otherwise
could not afford such services-legal aid-or when structured to
pursue a primarily public, not a primarily private, interest.,,
A similar comparison exists between providing health
insurance, providing health services to a closed, fee-paying group, and
providing health care to the community more generally. For the first
category, Congress has flatly stated that providing insurance
generally is not considered a charitable activity.81 For the second
category, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has successfully argued
in court that providing health services only to members who are able
to pay-the typical health maintenance organization ("HMO") model-
will not be considered charitable without some type of public-
benefitting "plus," although the position of the IRS (and the courts) is
somewhat unclear because these situations also involved entities that
did not themselves directly provide health care services.8 2 The
Treasury Department has separated out the last category by requiring
direct health care providers to have certain "community benefit"
characteristics in order to qualify as charities. These requirements are
primarily designed to provide access to everyone in the community
who can pay (including through Medicare and Medicaid) and
emergency care to everyone in the community regardless of their
ability to pay. They also prevent certain private actors (i.e., physician
groups) from obtaining prohibited private benefit for themselves.
8 3
While arguments can be made that any economic activity provides
incidental community benefits, given the substantial legal benefits
that charities enjoy, it is reasonable to require them to provide more
79. See supra note 17.
80. See Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411 (establishing procedures for public interest law
firms wishing to accept fees and continue to qualify as charitable); Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B.
152 (stating that a public interest law firm can qualify as charitable); Rev. Rul. 69-161, 1969-1
C.B. 149 (stating that providing free legal services to persons otherwise financially incapable of
obtaining such services is charitable), amplified by Rev. Rul. 78-428, 1978-2 C.B. 177 (permitting
fees to be charged if based only on ability to pay).
81. I.R.C. § 501(m) (2010) (denying charity status to organizations for which providing
commercial-type insurance is a substantial part of their activities).
82. See IHC Health Plans Inc. v. Comm'r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1202-03 (10th Cir, 2003)
(concluding that organizations promoting health by providing health insurance to all in the
community who are able to pay do not qualify as charities absent the provision of additional
community or public benefits); Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm'r, 30 F.3d 494, 501-02 (3d Cir.
1994) (same).
83. See Rev. Rul., 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in
For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Health Care Delivery Structures, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1, 11-14 (1995)
(tracing the history of not-for-profit hospitals in America).
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than incidental public benefit, which is what federal tax law currently
does.
Overall, therefore, the current federal tax law limits on the
purposes charities can further appear relatively well calibrated to not
unduly limit charities while at the same time to ensure that they are
in some way furthering a public benefit, thereby distinguishing them
from other private entities, including mutual benefit nonprofits.
Debates on the margins-with respect to the provision of health care
most recently but also with respect to the breadth of "educational"-
certainly exist and are important, but even then the debates usually
fit within this framework. That is, keeping the listed purposes broadly
and vaguely defined in most instances is an important aspect of
achieving the level of autonomy that best matches the unique role of
charities.84
2. Lack of General Limits on Internal Affairs
While the list of purposes charities must pursue may be
relatively broad and vaguely defined, current federal and state laws
are even more permissive with respect to regulating how charities
organize their internal affairs, including specific legal form,
governance structures, and methods charities use for accomplishing
their activities.8 5 For example, charities can choose among a variety of
legal forms-nonprofit corporation, trust, unincorporated association,
even limited liability company-and face few restrictions on the
numbers and compositions of their governing bodies.8 6 That being
said, it is not uncommon for Congress or the Treasury Department to
impose governance or other internal affairs limitations on particular
types of charities. For example, for hospitals, the Treasury
Department has long required a governing body that is representative
of the community-as opposed to consisting of only physicians or
84. But see Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA.
TAX REV. 1, 67 (2011) (suggesting that more effective enforcement of the existing limitations
might require brighter lines and, perhaps, more positive requirements).
85. See Evelyn Brody, Governing the Nonprofit Organization: Accommodating Autonomy in
Organization Law, 46 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 343, 356-58 (2008).
86. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 66-219, 1966-2 C.B. 208 (ruling that an otherwise-qualified charity
will not be precluded from that status under federal tax law solely because a single individual is
its sole trustee). But see CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227 (West 2010) (requiring California nonprofit
corporations to have a governing body majority that is not compensated by the corporation for
services other than as a director); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, GOVERNANCE AND RELATED
TOPICS-501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS 2-3 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/governance-practices.pdf (urging charities to avoid very small governing boards).
20121
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
members of a single family-and an open medical staff.8 7 The general
hands-off approach to the internal affairs of charities is consistent
with an autonomy perspective.
As importantly, all of the instances where the federal
government has imposed specific limitations on charity governance
activities share two key characteristics. First, the instances were all
reactions to evidence of significant violations of the nondistribution
and private benefit restrictions by the type of charity targeted. For
example, with respect to hospitals, the identified and targeted abuse
was groups of physicians operating purportedly charitable hospitals
primarily for their own benefit as opposed to for the benefit of the
larger community.88 Second, each set of limitations represents an
indirect attempt to ensure protection of the fundamental public
benefit character of the charity type at issue. Rather than attempting
to require charities to engage in specific activities, for the most part
Congress and the Treasury Department have instead tried to establish
conditions that create a more favorable environment for generating
public benefit without mandating how, specifically, that public benefit
should be achieved. For example, neither Congress nor the Treasury
Department has dictated the mix of medical services that a charity
hospital must provide or even the amount of free care such an entity
must render. Even Congress's most recent attempts to control the
activities of charity hospitals, enacted as part of health care reform,
have primarily been limited to enhanced public benefit disclosure and
improved fee-collection procedures, as opposed to directed substantive
activities.8 9 For the reasons already discussed, this indirect approach
to address specific, identified violations of the fundamental public
benefit character of charities is consistent with preserving charity
autonomy from government influence except when that character is
clearly threatened.
87. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (including these requirements as part of what has
come to be known as the "community benefit" standard); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-47-064 (Nov.
20, 2009) (applying this standard).
88. See Douglas Mancino, Income Tax Exemption of the Contemporary Nonprofit Hospital,
32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1015, 1053 (1988) (noting that medical boards run by one physician or a
small group of physicians are more likely to be viewed as being self-interested).
89. See Colinvaux, supra note 84, at 51 ("Instead of imposing a substantive positive
requirement of charity, the [health care reform] legislation settles instead for process-oriented
rules that are designed to promote a more charitable outcome."). Compare S. FIN. COMM., l11th
Cong., DESCRIPTION OF POLICY OPTIONS: FINANCING COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE REFORM 33-
34 (2009) (discussing the possibility of requiring charity hospitals to provide a minimum level of
charitable patient care), with Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
9007(a), 124 Stat. 119, 855-57 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 501(r) (Supp. IV 2010)) (imposing new
requirements on charity hospitals but not including a minimum level of charitable patient care).
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3. Limits on Interactions with Government Entities and Officials
In contrast to the general lack of limits on internal affairs and
methods for achieving permitted purposes, current federal tax laws
impose specific limitations on the ability of charities to interact with
government entities, officials, and want-to-be officials (i.e.,
candidates). Congress has explicitly limited the permitted amount of
lobbying by a charity and has absolutely prohibited charities from
supporting or opposing candidates for election to public office. 90 The
reasons for these restrictions are obscure. 9' That said, they have stood
the test of time and appear to be generally consistent with public
perceptions of the permitted scope for activities of charities. Are they,
however, consistent with the autonomy and public benefit
characteristics of charities, as developed above?
Turning first to the prohibition on supporting or opposing
candidates, there are two reasons to conclude that the answer to this
question is yes. First, supporting a specific candidate (or opposing her
electoral adversary) arguably provides a nonincidental private benefit
to that candidate, contrary to the public benefit character of
charities. 92 While it could be argued that by supporting or opposing
candidates a charity is promoting informed participation in elections
and so is also providing a public benefit, charities can avoid private
benefit and still promote informed electoral participation simply by
engaging in even-handed electoral activities that do not favor one
candidate over another.
Second, permitting charities to support or oppose particular
candidates would invite candidates, political parties, and their
supporters to pressure charities to support them. Such pressures
90. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010); see also I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (2010). At the same time, however,
charities are permitted to engage in an unlimited amount of advocacy that seeks to change
government regulations or policies, as long as the charities are not trying to influence legislation.
See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3), (c)(3) (2010); Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly,
Lobbying Issues, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FY 1997, at 261, 270-71 (1996), available at http://www.irs.govlpublirs-
tege/eotopicp97.pdf; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What is This "Lobbying" That We Are So Worried
About?, 26 YALE L. & POLW REV. 485, 509-511 (2008).
91. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 16-23, 28-29
(2003) (describing the origins of the lobbying limitation and the political campaign intervention
prohibition); Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Election Year Issues, in EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FY
2002, at 335, 448-51 (2001), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici02.pdf
(describing the origins of the political campaign intervention prohibition); Mayer, supra note 90,
at 499-501 (describing the origins of the lobbying limitation).
92. See generally Gregory L. Colvin, How Well Does the Tax Code Work in Regulating
Politics?, 12 J. TAX'N EXEMPT ORGS. 66 (2000).
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already exist to a limited degree, even with the prohibition in place,
but the existence of the prohibition provides charities with a ready
and convincing response to such pressures: you are asking us to break
the law. 93 The prohibition therefore serves to protect the autonomy of
charities from elected government officials.
The lobbying limitation is more problematic. It is not clear that
lobbying either necessarily involves providing a private benefit or
exposes charities to undue influence from government officials. The
original proponents of the limit on lobbying were primarily concerned
with the public benefit issue.94 Even they recognized, however, that, as
drafted, the limit is overinclusive as it also covers lobbying that is not
tainted by private benefit; the only reason that they apparently did
not draft a narrower provision was because they could not determine
how to do so. 95 It is also not clear why the now-existing private benefit
limitation-provided in regulations and other authority issued after
passage of the statutory limit on lobbying and described below-is not
sufficient to address this concern.
With respect to undue influence, if anything, the lobbying limit
appears to be aimed at preventing charities from unduly influencing
government, not the other way around. While the current scope of the
limit does not completely match that objective, nevertheless there is
little evidence that charities are at risk of being co-opted by
government officials to engage in lobbying efforts that are inconsistent
with the missions of the charities. It therefore appears that there is
little justification for limiting the autonomy of charities by restricting
their lobbying activities.
4. Government Funding
There are no legal restrictions on charities seeking or receiving
government funds, and government funders often exercise substantial
influence over charities by imposing conditions on the funds they
provide. Government funding in this context refers to funds that the
government gives to charities to perform certain government-selected
activities that benefit the public. An example of such funding would be
when governments select social service providers, such as foster care
agencies, to serve those that the government has decided to benefit.
Such government funding therefore does not include government
93. See Jack Siegel, The Wild, the Innocent, and the K Street Shuffle: The Tax System's Role
in Policing Interactions Between Charities and Politicians, 54 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 117, 132-
36 (2006) (identifying ways in which politicians can use nonprofits to influence the electorate).
94. See Houck, supra note 91, at 16-23; Mayer, supra note 90, at 500 & n.53.
95. See Mayer, supra note 90, at 500 & n.55.
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funds that flow to charities selected by the beneficiaries of those funds
who receive goods or services that benefit them personally in return
(e.g., when a Medicare recipient chooses to visit a particular charity
hospital for medical care or when a parent uses a voucher to pay for
her child's tuition at the charity school of her choice). Nor does it
include government funds paid to charities as fair-market-value
payment for goods or services provided directly to the government.
96
In these situations, the beneficiary or the government is a purchaser
of goods or services for its own benefit, a context addressed later in
this Part. There will be situations that do not fall neatly on one side or
other of this line, but that is not critical for purposes of this
discussion.
The influence governments exercise through providing funding
for activities that benefit the public does not raise the same risk of
diversion from public benefit that influence by private entities raises
for the simple reason that the government itself is dedicated generally
to providing public, not private, benefit. But government influence,
whether through providing funding or otherwise, can raise concerns
about whether a particular charity is in fact helping solve government
and market failures (and promoting pluralism) since the charity is
effectively furthering the government's particular view of public
benefit. This point has led to disputes in some instances between
recipients of government funds and governments.
9 7
Even if a charity is so dependent on government funding and
resulting government influence that it might fairly be characterized as
an arm of the government, such characterization should not disqualify
the charity from any of the legal benefits it customarily enjoys. This is
because government entities enjoy very similar legal benefits,
including exemption from most if not all taxes, the ability to receive
deductible charitable contributions (as long as the government uses
such contributions for a public purpose), and most if not all of the
other exemptions and benefits that charities enjoy.98 So while a lack of
96. See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., NONPROFIT SECTOR: SIGNIFICANT
FEDERAL FUNDS REACH THE SECTOR THROUGH VARIOUS MECHANISMS, BUT MORE COMPLETE AND
RELIABLE FUNDING DATA ARE NEEDED (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-
193 (describing and attempting to quantify the flow of federal funds to nonprofit organizations).
97. Bishwapriya Sanyal, NGO's Self-Defeating Quest for Autonomy, 554 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 21, 22 (1997).
98. See I.R.C. § 103 (2010) (excluding interest on any state or local bond from federal
income taxation); id. § 115 (excluding state and local government income from federal income
taxation); id. § 170(c)(2) (including within the definition of a deductible charitable contribution a
contribution to a domestic government if exclusively for public purposes); CHARLES A. TROST &
PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 6.19 (2d ed. 2003)
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autonomy from the government may raise other concerns for charities,
not the least of which is prioritizing efficiency in the delivery of the
services desired by the government over providing a broader
community benefit, it should not affect the eligibility of a charity for
its otherwise-available legal benefits since there is no indication that
government influence generally results in diversion from public
benefit goals. 99
There is also no need for a new legal barrier to government
funding of charities in most instances for the simple reason that
charities already generally have the right to refuse to participate in
government programs. Government funding is therefore distinct from
government regulation, which would require all charities (or charities
of a particular type) to conform to that regulation. While perhaps
charities were once naive enough to not realize that government
funding could come with significant strings, the many conflicts
between government funders and charities have undoubtedly
eliminated such illusions for the vast majority of charity leaders. 100 It
may be difficult to do some kinds of activities, such as engaging in
scientific research and providing certain social services, without
accepting government funds, but that choice still exists. It is also true
that government funding of specific activities may reduce private
support for those activities and that government performance of those
activities directly may also crowd out private actors, including
charities, currently engaged in the activities. Such indirect effects on
(describing the federal government's general immunity from state and local taxation); id. § 6.20
(describing the immunity from state and local taxation for income from federal securities).
99. See RACHEL M. MCCLEARY, GLOBAL COMPASSION: PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1939, at 6 (2009) (considering the effect of government funding
on private international relief and development organizations); SHERLOCK & GRAVELLE, supra
note 11, at 48 (noting that when the government provides funding to charities, as opposed to
directly engaging in activities itself, empirical research indicates the government may either
crowd out or "crowd in" private funding); Arthur C. Brooks, Do Government Subsidies to
Nonprofits Crowd Out Donations or Donors?, 31 PUB. FIN. REV. 166, 175-77 (2003) (concluding
that increased public funding of nonprofits does not reduce total donations to nonprofits but does
change the mix of donors); Thomas A. Garret & Russell M. Rhine, Government Growth and
Private Contributions to Charity, 143 PUB. CHOICE 103, 115-19 (2010) (in the education context,
concluding that whether government funding crowds out private donations depends on the
source of government revenue, how that revenue is used, and the rational ignorance of the
private donors); Michael Rushton & Arthur C. Brooks, Government Funding of Nonprofit
Organizations, in FINANCING NONPROFITS: PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 69, 88-90 (Dennis R.
Young ed., 2007) (discussing concerns raised by government funding of all types).
100. See, e.g., Steven Rathgeb Smith, Government Financing of Nonprofit Activity, in
NONPROFITS & GOVERNMENT, supra note 24, at 219, 234-36 (describing such conflicts).
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charities appear unavoidable absent a wholesale rollback of
government involvement in areas where charities are also active. 1 1
B. Autonomy with Respect to Nonprofit Sector Actors
External influences on charities can also come from within the
nonprofit sector, primarily from four groups: management, including
governing body members; beneficiaries; donors; and mutual benefit
nonprofits. Management will be addressed later in this Part under the
prohibition on capital investors, since the primary concern with
managers is that they may attempt to siphon off a charity's net
revenues for their personal gain.102 This Section will address the other
three groups.
1. Beneficiaries
The term "beneficiaries" in the charity context refers to those
who benefit gratuitously from a charity's activities, as distinguished
from consumers who pay full fair market value for the goods or
services they receive from a charity; the latter will be discussed later
in this Part.10 3 Beneficiaries would include, for example, those who
receive free meals from soup kitchens, free shelter from homeless
shelters, disaster relief from the Red Cross and Salvation Army, free
education from a charity school, or free medical care from a charity
clinic. Some individuals will be somewhere between a pure beneficiary
and a pure consumer, such as a student who receives a partial
scholarship. But for the purposes of this Section, it is the one-hundred-
percent beneficiary that will be considered.
First and foremost, existing law prevents charities from only
serving a limited and well-defined group of beneficiaries by
prohibiting "private benefit.' 01 4 While at its broadest interpretation
"private benefit" would include any benefit to any private individual or
101. See supra notes 77 & 99 and accompanying text (describing the possible "crowding out"
effect of government direct activities and funding).
102. See infra Part II.D.1 (describing why charities are prohibited from having owners and
the IRS's and Congress's attempts to prevent "profit leakage" by penalizing those who receive
excessive benefits from charities).
103. See infra Part II.D.4 (highlighting the distinction between activities that are "inherently
charitable," for which charities may charge full market value, and those that are not).
104. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2008) (requiring charities to serve "a public
rather than a private interest). See generally Andrew Megosh et al., Private Benefit Under
501(c)(3), in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FY 2001, at 135 (2000), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-




private organization, that is not how the term is used in this context.
As the federal government has recognized, the paying of compensation
to a private individual or the purchase of goods from a business
confers private benefit, yet charities could not function (i.e., could not
provide public benefit) without being able to engage in such activities.
More fundamentally, even feeding the hungry or housing the homeless
provides a private benefit to the beneficiaries, yet such activities have
always been deemed as being consistent with charity status. The
government has therefore determined that organizations should not
lose their charitable status if the private benefit provided is
"incidental," defined in both qualitative and quantitative terms. 10 5 The
qualitative aspect is that the benefit is necessary to further the
charity's public-benefit-serving purpose. 106 The quantitative aspect is
that the benefit is no more than what is needed to serve that
purpose. 10 7 Examples of such incidental private benefits include
paying employees and vendors reasonable (i.e., fair market value)
amounts for their services and goods if those services and goods are
used to further the charity's purpose and providing services and goods
for free or at below-market prices when doing so furthers that
purpose, such as providing food or shelter to the poor.
Besides the general private benefit restriction, there are no
legal barriers preventing beneficiaries from co-opting a charity to
serve their private benefit as opposed to providing a public benefit.
The private benefit restriction does, however, include the requirement
that a charity serve a "charitable class," loosely defined as a relatively
large and indeterminate group of individuals circumscribed by some
shared "charitable" characteristic. 108 That requirement is sufficient to
create a number of substantial practical barriers to beneficiaries co-
opting a charity. First, a group that qualifies as a charitable class is
unlikely to be able to engage in conscious concerted action, given its
size and indeterminate nature. Second, if any particular subset of that
105. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978) (concluding that a hospital leasing
adjacent land to staff members is "incidental" and does not detract from the public purpose of the
hospital); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-42-057 (July 23, 2008). For a critique of this private benefit
standard and a recommendation for a clearer although narrower version of this doctrine, see
John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063 (2006).
106. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978).
107. Id.
108. See Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1076-77 (1989) (holding that
Republican candidates benefiting from the work of the academy's graduates did not constitute a
"charitable class"); see also PETER LUXTON, THE LAW OF CHARITIES 171-72 (Judith Hill ed., 2001)
(discussing the need for a charity to serve a sufficient section of the community under English
law); Colombo, supra note 105, at 1080 (noting that the private benefit doctrine has, as applied
by the IRS, expanded well beyond a focus on the size of the charitable class benefitted).
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group tries to redirect a charity's efforts, the charity's leadership can
redirect the charity's benefits to other beneficiaries and potential
beneficiaries-a "biting the hand that feeds you" result. Third, the
influence of beneficiaries over a charity generally is based on the
ability of beneficiaries to call charity leaders publicly to account for
failing to provide public benefit; unless the beneficiaries can hide their
private benefit under a convincing veneer of public benefit, this lever
is not available to redirect a charity away from providing public
benefit. Likely for these reasons, there is little if any evidence of
beneficiaries-whether soup kitchen patrons or art museum visitors
who are not also donors-using their influence to cause a charity to
depart from providing public benefit.
2. Donors
Donors are a different story. Because they provide financial
support, and sometimes the bulk of financial support, to many
charities, they have the potential to use that influence for their own,
private benefit. Existing law restrains the ability of donors to
influence charities in three specific ways.
The first way targets the situation in which a charity is
dependent on a relatively small group of donors. Over forty years ago,
the Treasury Department and Congress recognized based on
significant evidence that such charities could be and had, in fact, often
been used for the private benefit of their donors. 10 9 For this reason,
Congress divided charities into two categories: private foundations
and public charities.110 Unless a charity is engaged in activity that
indicates significant public oversight-hospitals, schools, and
churches primarily-or has a sufficiently broad base of financial
support, it will be classified as a private foundation and subject to a
restrictive set of rules primarily targeted at the provision of private
benefit."'
109. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 89TH CONG., TREASURY DEPARTMENT ON PRIVATE
FOUNDATIONS 14-20, 34, 37-41, 45-47, 50-53 (Comm. Print 1965); THOMAS A. TROYER, THE 1969
PRIVATE FOUNDATION LAW: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON ITS ORIGINS AND UNDERPINNINGS 12-14
(2000) (discussing the pre-1969 conceptual differences between private foundations and public
charities). But see John G. Simon, The Regulation of American Foundations: Looking Backward
at the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 6 VOLUNTAS 243, 245 (1995) (questioning whether the data
presented indicated that more than a relatively small percentage of private foundations had
engaged in abusive actions).
110. See I.R.C. § 509(a) (2006) (defining "private foundation").
111. See I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A), 509(a)(1)-(3), 4940-4946 (2006 & Supp. I 2007) (limiting
certain classes of charitable contributions, defining "private foundation," and dealing with
certain taxable elements of private foundations).
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The second way to restrain donors is through imposing
stringent limitations on what donors can receive in return for their
deductible contributions and on the extent to which they can control
their donated funds or other assets.
112
Finally, substantial donors may be considered charity insiders
(known as "disqualified persons") if they exercise substantial influence
over a charity, including if they are a voting member of a charity's
governing body.113 As such, they are subject to financial penalties
known as "intermediate sanctions" if they receive any excess economic
benefits (i.e., benefits that are not part of a fair-market-value
exchange and are more than incidental)."
4
These three sets of rules together provide effective protection
against improper donor influence without unduly limiting the
autonomy of charities. In situations where a single donor or small
group of donors effectively controls a charity, the private foundation
rules prohibit certain types of transactions with insiders, including
substantial donors; limit business holdings and investments; and
prohibit or require certain procedures be followed for certain types of
activities.11 5 Currently, these rules also force private foundations to
spend a certain amount on providing public benefit, but even the
specific private foundation rules relating to timing arose from
concerns that donors were often using the lack of a current spending
requirement to receive a private benefit in the form of an immediate
charitable contribution deduction without providing any offsetting
current public benefit. 1 6 While at least some of the rules were based
on relatively thin evidence of abuse, in general they were designed to
prohibit violations of the public benefit requirement that neither
public pressure nor the IRS had been able to sufficiently prevent."
7
The more recent efforts by Congress to place limits on the internal
112. See I.R.C. §§ 170(a)(3), (f), 6115 (2006 & Supp. I 2007) (limiting certain deductions for
individuals and requiring charitable organizations to disclose quid pro quo contributions).
113. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (imposing a twenty-five percent tax on each
"excess benefit transaction" for a disqualified person); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(2)(ii) (2010)
(listing being a substantial contributor as one of the facts and circumstances tending to show
that a person is having such influence).
114. See I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1)-(b) (2006 & Supp. 1 2007) (imposing taxes for excess benefits).
115. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (listing the activities where charitable contribution deductions
are limited).
116. See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 36 (1970) (explaining that prior laws allowed for substantial
tax benefits for contributions even if the charity received no current benefit); TROYER, supra note
109, at 12 (explaining how such behavior justified the 1969 Act's restrictions on self-dealing).
117. See TROYER, supra note 109, at 11-12 (outlining empirical and conceptual grounds for
Congress's special restrictions in the 1969 Act).
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activities of supporting organizations and donor-advised funds,
including the extension of some of the private foundation rules to
these entities, apparently grew out of the congressional view that such
entities also suffer from the same problem of significant control by a
single or small group of related donors leading to private benefit."1
8
For other charities, the more general limitations on donors
appear sufficient to prevent attempts to divert a charity from
providing public benefit. A charity that is not a private foundation
necessarily receives at least some measure of public oversight through
its beneficiaries, members, or other sources of financial support,
hindering the ability of a single substantial donor or small group of
substantial donors to influence the charity improperly. The charitable
contribution deduction requirement of no significant return benefit
also hinders such improper influence since the deduction is often a
significant motivation, at least for more substantial donors. 119 For
donors with particularly strong influence, the threat of intermediate
sanctions inhibits them from hijacking a charity to benefit their own,
private interests. Finally, there is one other factor at play. In part
because of all of these limitations, even the largest donors are likely to
be significantly motivated by the desire to provide public benefit
through the charity. It would be counterproductive for them to prevent
the charity from in fact providing such a benefit.120 The existing legal
rules therefore appear well designed to prevent donors from exercising
influence over charities in a manner that would lead charities to
abandon providing public benefit, without unduly restricting the
autonomy of charities with respect to seeking and receiving donations.
3. Affiliated Mutual Benefit Nonprofits
It is not uncommon for mutual benefit nonprofits, such as
unions and trade associations, to have closely affiliated charities. For
example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is closely affiliated with the
118. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 1231-1245, 120 Stat. 780,
1094-1108 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.); Press Release, Senators
Chuck Grassley & Max Baucus, Grassley, Baucus Urge President's Support for Reforms to Boost
Charitable Work (July 21, 2006), available at http://finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/
release/?id=43356ffe-96e7-4a2c-b581-dle7l5ca6bd4 (supporting a restoration of charitable
benefit to charitable tax breaks).
119. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF ALLOWING NONITEMIZERS TO DEDUCT
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 9-10 (2002) (summarizing research relating to the effect of the
deduction on charitable contributions); Brody & Cordes, supra note 34, at 144-47 (same).
120. But see TERESA ODENDAHL, CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME: GENEROSITY AND SELF INTEREST
AMONG THE PHILANTHROPIC ELITE 232-34 (1990) (arguing that upper-class donors primarily
engage in philanthropy to reproduce the upper class).
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National Chamber Foundation, the American Bar Association ("ABA")
is affiliated with the American Bar Endowment and the American Bar
Foundation, and the American Bankers Association is affiliated with
the ABA Education Foundation.121 Such a close relationship creates
the risk that a charity's furtherance of its ostensibly permitted
purpose-say public education regarding a particular issue-could be
directed in such a way as to benefit the members of the related mutual
benefit nonprofit.
It is therefore surprising to see that existing law permits a very
close relationship between mutual benefit nonprofits and their
charitable affiliates. Both Congress and the IRS have explicitly
blessed such arrangements, permitting charities to support certain
noncharitable nonprofits and permitting noncharitable nonprofits to
form and control a charitable affiliate, respectively.122 All the activities
funded by the affiliated charity must still further one of the purposes
permitted for charities (education probably being the most common
chosen purpose), and the private benefit and other limitations on
charities fully apply.123 That said, the close relationship with and even
control by a mutual benefit nonprofit would likely make it difficult to
prevent activities that further the agendas of the mutual benefit
nonprofit's members.
There are three reasons, however, why these close
relationships are permitted. First, there is a general federal tax law
principle that the separateness of distinct legal entities will be
respected absent evidence that the separate legal status is a sham,
such as a failure to keep the finances of two distinct entities
separate. 124 Second, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the
Constitution requires the federal government to permit charities to
create closely affiliated noncharitable entities to engage in speech-
related activities that the charities otherwise cannot engage in,
specifically political campaign intervention and substantial
121. About ABE, AMERICAN BAR ENDOWMENT, http://www.abendowment.org/about
/index.asp; About, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, http://www.americanbarfoundation.org
/aboutlindex.html; About Us, NATIONAL CHAMBER FOUNDATION, http:/ncf.uschamber.
comlaboutus/; About ABAEF, ABA EDUCATION FOUNDATION, http://www.aba.com/ABAEF/cnc-
aboutef.htm).
122. Ward L. Thomas & Judith E. Kindell, Affiliations Among Political, Lobbying and
Educational Organizations, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FY 2000, at 255, 255-56 (1999), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicso.pdf.
123. Rev. Rul. 54-243, 1954-1 C.B. 92; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,443 (Mar. 3, 1971)
(reaffirming the conclusion and reasoning of Rev. Rul. 54-243).
124. See, e.g., Moline Props. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943).
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lobbying. 125 While the constitutional requirement does not flow in the
other direction, as a practical matter it would be relatively easy for
even an established noncharitable entity to create a charitable
affiliate, have all of its members become members of the charitable
affiliate with whatever control rights over the affiliate that they
previously exercised over the noncharity, and then give the charity
control over the noncharity, thereby shifting the direction of control
(and so obtaining the constitutional protection) without changing the
result. Third and similarly, the board members of a mutual benefit
nonprofit could simply create a "nonaffiliated" charity without a
formal connection to the noncharity and still engage in (charity)
activities that are consistent with the interests and agenda of the
noncharity's members. A simple prohibition on mutual benefit
nonprofit control of a charity would therefore almost certainly have
little practical effect and a more sophisticated set of rules would be
difficult to design, much less implement.
Fortunately, the allowance of these close relationships between
mutual benefit nonprofits and charities does not appear to have
resulted in improper benefit to the members of the mutual benefit
entities. For example, while the National Chamber Foundation's
educational efforts focus, not surprisingly, on research and public
education that favors free enterprise in the United States, its efforts
appear generic enough to be indistinguishable from those of
unaffiliated charities with similar ideological positions, such as the
Heritage Foundation or the American Enterprise Institute. 12 6 This
suggests that either the incentive for a mutual benefit nonprofit to
abuse its control is not as strong as might be supposed or the ability of
the IRS to enforce the private benefit limitation in this context is
greater (or perceived to be greater) than might be expected, or both.
127
There does not appear therefore to be sufficient evidence to support
the creation of special rules to police this set of relationships, at least
at this time. These relationships should perhaps, however, be an area
125. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 n.6, 553-54 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (allowing a charitable organization to have a lobbying affiliate under
I.R.C. § 501(c)); see also Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing
Regan); Miriam Galston, Campaign Speech and Contextual Analysis, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
100, 114-17 (2007) (discussing Regan and Rossotti).
126. See National Chamber Foundation Programs, NATIONAL CHAMBER FOUNDATION,
http://ncf.uschamber.comh programs/ (outlining NCF's business-related programs).
127. See James B. Sweeney & Robert H. Billig, IRS Pursuing Association Audits More




for future scrutiny by both the government and scholars to determine
whether this initial impression is correct.
C. Autonomy with Respect to Families
Existing legal rules generally restrain the interactions of
families and charities where there has been significant evidence that
families are likely to use their influence over charities for their own,
private benefit as opposed to pursuing public benefit. There are at
least three ways that family groups may influence a charity to provide
them with private benefit and divert the charity from providing public
benefit. One way is if a particular family provides the bulk of funding
for a charity that is not otherwise easily held accountable by the
larger public. Congress designed the private foundation rules
discussed above in large part to address this situation, and those rules
appear to have been mostly, if not completely, successful.
128
A second way is if a family creates a charity to pursue a
mission that primarily benefits that family. For example, a family
member might create a charity to engage in genealogical research
focused on that person's family. The Treasury Department has
generally denied attempts to create a charities with this purpose
based on the existing private benefit restriction.
1 29
A third and more subtle way to gain such influence is for the
members of a single family to create an organization that undoubtedly
qualifies as a charity under existing law and then to fill the charity's
key leadership positions with family members. 30 While in theory the
same restrictions that in general prevent charity managers from
benefitting themselves inappropriately should prevent these family
members from receiving inappropriate private benefits, the close
relationships of the managers combined with the limited enforcement
resources of the IRS and state attorneys general offices might render
those restrictions ineffective in the same way that Congress and
Treasury found was the case with respect to what are now classified
as private foundations. Certainly the IRS and many commentators
believe that a charity should, at a minimum, have a governing body
with a majority of members who are not related to each other either by
128. Supra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.
129. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(iii), ex. 1 (2008) (listing educational organizations
dedicated to studying the history of a single family as an example of organizations that operate
for the benefit of private interests and not for public interest as required by I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
130. See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2004-37-040 (June 7, 2004) (carefully examining a
family-controlled nonprofit organization, although ultimately determining that the organization
continued to qualify as a charity).
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family or financial ties so as to prevent related managers from
inappropriately benefitting themselves. 
131
Unlike the private foundation situation, however, there does
not appear to have been a comprehensive study of charities with these
characteristics to determine if such a requirement is necessary. There
are certainly examples of family controlled charities that raise private
benefit concerns, such as Angel Food Ministries and Oral Roberts
University. 132 That said, there are counterexamples of apparently
well-run charities dominated by a particular family, such as the Billy
Graham Evangelistic Association.1 33 Moreover, it could be argued that
the possible negative examples actually demonstrate that there is no
need for such a requirement or other legal restrictions to address this
situation because nonfamily members involved in the charity or the
media, as was the case with both Angel Food Ministries and Oral
Roberts University, will call the charity to account, even if
government officials do not.1 34 Family relationships also do not
necessarily lead to collusion, as illustrated by the recent public dispute
at Feed the Children between, among others, the now former
President and his daughter, who serves as the organization's general
counsel.1 35 Furthermore, there is little empirical evidence that
"independent" governing board members actually improve governance
in either the nonprofit context or the for-profit context, as members of
the IRS Advisory Committee on Tax Exempt and Government Entities
131. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 86, at 3 ('[A] governing board should
include independent members and should not be dominated by employees or others who are not,
by their very nature, independent individuals because of family or business relationships.");
Reiser, supra note 50, at 43 (arguing that group governance can be seriously undermined with
related directors).
132. See April Marciszewski, Some Withholding Judgment on ORU, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 7,
2007, at Al (lawsuit filed by former faculty alleging misuse of charity funds by founder's family);
Christopher Quinn, Family Calls Ministry Suit a Money Grab, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 3, 2009,
at 1C (lawsuit by two board members accusing family members who controlled a charity of
enriching themselves).
133. See, e.g., Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, MINISTRYWATCH.COM,
http://www.ministrywatch.com/profilefbilly-graham.aspx (detailing a watchdog organization's
evaluation). But see Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU
http://www.bbb.org/charity-reviews/nationallbily-graham-evangelistic-association-in-charlotte-
nc-1146 (reporting that the charity did not provide requested information).
134. See Christopher Quinn, Agreement Ends Angel Food Case, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 20,
2009, at 1B (reporting a settlement that required a forensic audit and certain governance
improvements); Shannon Muchmore, ORU Emerging from Crisis, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 23, 2008,
at All (reporting governance changes in the wake of the lawsuit by former faculty).
135. See Grant Williams, Feed the Children Accuses Founder of Taking Bribes, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 14, 2010, at 20 (chronicling Larry Jones's ouster as president and his
accusations that his daughter, Feed the Children's vice president and general counsel, was a
"key figure in stirring turmoil" at the antipoverty charity).
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recently noted. 136 Finally, restrictions on family member involvement
with charities not only impose additional administrative burdens on
charities, but they also potentially deny them the valuable aid that
can come from family members who share a commitment to a
particular, worthwhile cause. Lacking further data, there is therefore
reason to believe that outside the private foundation context, which
Congress has already comprehensively addressed, family influence
over charities is sufficiently constrained by the existing legal rules.
D. Autonomy with Respect to Market Actors
The last category of private actors that potentially could pull or
push a charity away from providing public benefit, in part or in whole,
is those individuals and groups that interact with the charity through
the marketplace. As detailed in this Section, one set of these actors is
actually foreclosed from such interactions--capital investors (i.e.,
owners). While there have been recent proposals to relax this
restraint, doing so would be inadvisable because of the unjustified
reliance of such proposals on effective government enforcement of the
public benefit requirement.
Other parties are, however, permitted to interact with charities
in the marketplace, including lenders, sellers of goods and services,
and purchasers of goods and services. Lenders, however, face
significant restraints, both legal and practical, that sufficiently limit
their influence (at the cost of reducing charity access to credit).
Similarly, sellers of goods and services also face legal and practical
restrictions that generally are sufficient to prevent co-opting of
charities, except perhaps in the area of fundraising. The one major
area that remains almost unregulated, however, is the influence of
purchasers of goods and services from charities-specifically, the
influence of consumers who purchase services (it almost always is
services, not goods), even at fair-market-value prices, in furtherance of
permitted purposes for a charity. For reasons detailed below, the
existing legal restrictions may be unable to prevent the "invisible
hand" of these consumers from pushing charities away from providing
public benefit.
136. Bonnie S. Brier et al., The Appropriate Role of the Internal Revenue Service with Respect
to Tax-Exempt Organization Good Governance Issues, in ADVISORY COMM. ON TAX EXEMPT AND





Charities are absolutely prohibited from having owners (i.e.,
capital investors who receive in return for their investment a right to
profits and to assets on dissolution and the ability to transfer that
right). Federal tax law imposes this limit through the statutory
prohibition on private inurement, which is supported by both
regulatory requirements and an excise tax imposed on charity insiders
who violate the prohibition. 137 State laws generally impose this limit
through statutory nondistribution requirements for nonprofit
corporations and common law restrictions on charitable trusts.138 The
effect of these laws is to prevent a specific group of private parties-
owners-from requiring a charity to serve their private interests and,
in doing so, diverge from providing a public benefit.
139
Even with this restriction, however, there still exists the risk
that individuals with sufficient influence over a charity might cause
its net revenues to be paid out to them in the form of, for example,
excessive compensation. While such an end-run around the private
inurement and nondistribution requirement has long been prohibited,
in the 1990s Congress enhanced the ability of the IRS to prevent such
profit leakage by creating an excise tax regime, known as
intermediate sanctions, that penalizes insiders who receive improper
economic benefits and managers who knowingly approve such
transactions. 140 Especially with this enhancement, in a world of
perfect government enforcement such leakage could therefore be
sufficiently addressed, but the reality is that the limited enforcement
resources and abilities of both the IRS and state attorneys general has
137. I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2), 501(c)(3), 4958 (2006 & Supp. I 2007); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(b)(4), (c)(2) (2008).
138. Hansmann, supra note 16, at 838-40.
139. This long-standing prohibition is not without its critics. See DAN PALLOTTA,
UNCHARITABLE: HOW RESTRAINTS ON NONPROFITS UNDERMINE THEIR POTENTIAL 116-25 (2009)
(arguing that removal of the nondistribution constraint would significantly increase the funds
available to charities); M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the
Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 607-09 (2009) (arguing the government should
eliminate "discriminatory" taxes against "corporate philanthropy"); Anup Malani & Eric A.
Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2021-22 (2007) (arguing tax
breaks for charities should not be conditioned on a specific corporate form). But see Brian Galle,
Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1214 (2010) (identifying numerous problems with
relaxing this prohibition); James R. Hines, Jr. et al., The Attach on Nonprofit Status: A
Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1183-84 (2010) (same); Reiser, supra note 50, at
39-40 (same).
140. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (limiting the economic benefit a tax-exempt
organization may confer to insiders).
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not always proven sufficient to answer this call. 141 Congress and
Treasury have therefore developed a number of targeted rules to
prevent such profit leakage in situations where it has been found
likely to occur even in the face of the existing, general rules.
One such situation is when an organization relies on a small
group of related donors for financial support and does not engage in
activities that result in significant public scrutiny. As discussed
previously, Congress has addressed this situation through the private
foundation classification and related rules, which, among other
restrictions, bar most financial transactions between such charities
and insiders, including substantial contributors. 142 While the private
foundation rules also require enforcement, their bright-line nature
facilitates both that enforcement and compliance on the part of private
foundation leaders acting in good faith.
Another such situation is the requirement that charity
hospitals have a governing body that is representative of the
community-as opposed to consisting of only physicians or members of
a single family-and an open medical staff.143 These restrictions arose
from the apparently common situation of a group of physicians
opening up a purportedly charity hospital but then restricting its
services to their own patients, thereby providing private benefit to
that physician group. 144 More recently, Congress imposed specific
governing body and other restrictions on credit counseling
organizations in the wake of discovering that many, if not most, of
these organizations had been violating the nondistribution constraint
and private benefit limitations.14 A further example is the limitations
141. See Lloyd H. Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First
Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 494-95, 524-25 (2010)
(collecting criticisms of both state and federal enforcement of existing laws regulating charities).
142. See I.R.C. § 4941 (2006) (limiting "self-dealing" for foundations).
143. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (dictating requirements for charitable hospitals).
144. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
145. See STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, THE
'TENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006," AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28, 2006, AND As
CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE ON AUGUST 3, 2006, at 315-16 (2006) (from 2004 to 2006, the IRS
completed audits of section 501(c)(3) credit counseling agencies representing more than forty
percent of the revenue in the I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) credit counseling industry, all of which resulted in
termination or proposed termination of tax-exempt status); PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, PROFITEERING IN A NON-PROFIT INDUSTRY: ABUSIVE PRACTICES IN CREDIT
COUNSELING, S. REP. 109-55, at 32 (2005) (imposing regulations on credit counseling
organizations); Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS Takes New Steps on Credit
Counseling Groups Following Widespread Abuse (May 15, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/O,,id=156996,00.html (discussing the IRS's approach to
credit counseling organizations); Colinvaux, supra note 84, at 47-49 (discussing the profit models
and tax evasion of credit counseling organizations).
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on what activities qualify as "scientific." Those limitations require that
such activities involve "basic" research and have other characteristics
demonstrating public benefit, such as government funding or public
dissemination.146  The Treasury Department designed these
limitations to prevent organizations engaged in research activities
that primarily provided private, as opposed to public, benefit from
qualifying as charities. 1
47
In these situations, Congress and Treasury generally chose not
to dictate what specific public-benefitting activities the charities at
issue should engage in. Instead, they chose to prohibit certain
problematic activities and/or indirectly influence the choice of public-
benefitting activities by requiring certain governance changes. For
example, neither Congress nor the IRS has dictated the mix of medical
services that a charity hospital must offer or even-at least so far-
how much free care such an entity must provide. 148 Private
foundations are free to pursue almost any activity (other than
lobbying) permitted to charities generally, although they must comply
with more onerous procedural requirements in many instances.1 49 The
one significant, recent exception is credit counseling agencies-and
there, Congress was responding to pervasive and egregious violations
in a very specific area. 150 Whether consciously or not, Congress and
Treasury therefore have acted as if they recognize that dictating
exactly what charities have to do would be problematic in most
instances. As detailed previously, this approach is the correct one
because such protection of charities from government influence is
necessary if charities are to fulfill their societal role of being distinct
from, among other groups, governments, unless specific, government-
mandated restrictions are needed to offset the negative, private-
benefitting influence of individuals or other groups.
2. Lenders
Lenders are another set of private parties that presumably
would use their market influence-in this case, the market for debt
financing-over a charity to redirect its activities to their benefit if
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5) (2010).
147. See Rev. Rul. 76-296, 1976-2 C.B. 142 (explaining the public dissemination aspect of the
regulations in these terms).
148. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
149. See I.R.C. § 4945(d)(3)-(4) (2006) (describing eligible "taxable expenditures" for private
foundations).
150. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also I.R.C. § 501(q).
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they could do so. 151 It is the ability to do so, however, that does not
appear to exist. If a lender is truly a lender, as opposed to a disguised
equity investor, then the only obligation that the charity has to the
lender is to repay the amount borrowed plus interest, not, as is the
case with an equity investor, to maximize profits overall. The
influence of lenders is also limited by the fact that charities cannot be
forced into bankruptcy and by the other restrictions on lenders even
when a charity voluntary chooses to file for bankruptcy. 152 At the same
time, charities that voluntarily choose to file for bankruptcy enjoy the
same protections from creditors provided to other entities, including
the automatic stay on creditors' claims.15 3 A charity could, of course,
agree to give a lender more authority over the charity than a plain
vanilla loan would provide, but such an agreement would have to
comply with both the nondistribution constraint and the fiduciary
duties of the charity's board members. There also does not appear to
be any evidence that lenders have often sought or obtained such
authority, much less authority that would threaten the charity's
ability to provide public benefit.
3. Sellers of Goods and Services
Similarly, sellers of goods or services to a charity might also be
able to use their influence to push the charity away from providing
public benefit and pull it toward providing them with a private
benefit. Setting aside charity managers, addressed above, and given
the private inurement and private benefit restrictions, a charity's only
obligation to a seller of goods and services is to pay the price of such
goods and services, however, not to alter in any way the charity's
overall mission. With one exception, there again does not appear to be
any significant evidence of improper seller influence over a charity
other than situations where the seller has ties to a charity insider-
151. See Robert J. Yetman, Borrowing and Debt, in FINANCING NONPROFITS, supra note 99,
at 243, 244 (stating that sixty percent of nonprofits have some form of debt outstanding, with an
average debt to assets ratio of thirty-three percent, based on IRS statistics).
152. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2006) (prohibiting involuntary bankruptcy cases against "a
corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation"); id. § 363(d)(1)
(prohibiting a bankruptcy trustee from violating nonbankruptcy law that governs the transfer of
property owned by such a corporation); id. § 1112(c) (prohibiting bankruptcy courts from forcing
such corporations to convert from a chapter 11 reorganization to a chapter 7 liquidation); S. REP.
NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978) (explaining that such corporations are "[e]leemosynary institutions,
such as churches, schools, and charitable organizations and foundations").
153. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), (b).
[Vol. 65:1:51
THE "INDEPENDENT" SECTOR
that is, someone covered by the private inurement prohibition and
therefore potentially exposed to the intermediate sanctions. 1
54
The one exception is in the fundraising area. There is evidence
that for-profit fundraisers have become so important to certain
charities that the fundraiser has arguably been able to alter the
charity's fundraising operations so as to primarily benefit the
fundraiser. The case of United Cancer Council ("UCC") is an example
of this situation. 155 In that case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the fundraiser received more than ninety percent of the
donations raised and also co-owned the donor list generated by the
various fundraising appeals. 156 Furthermore, this case does not appear
to be an isolated incident in that there are a number of recent state
attorney general reports stating that many other charities pay similar
percentages of contributions to commercial fundraisers.
157
The UCC case and other examples of for-profit fundraisers
receiving the vast majority of contributions are troubling, particularly
because many of these situations, including that of UCC, apparently
involved otherwise independent charities that voluntarily chose to
enter into such a relationship with a for-profit fundraiser. 158 It does
not appear, however, that this behavior generally extends beyond the
fundraising context for two reasons. First, the incentive for charity
leaders to enter into such relationships is relatively clear but limited
to fundraising: any money the charity receives as a result of the
campaign run by the fundraiser is arguably money the charity
otherwise would not have received and so tends to be viewed as "found
money." The fact that in the course of the charity obtaining these new
154. See supra notes 137, 140 and accompanying text.
155. United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1999).
156. Id. at 1175-79.
157. See, e.g., CHARITIES BUREAU, N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF LAW, PENNIES FOR CHARITY: WHERE
YOUR MONEY GOES i (2009), available at http://www.charitiesnys.com/pdfs/2009_- Pennies.pdf
(reporting that for 584 telemarketing campaigns for charities in 2008, in over eighty percent of
them the charities kept less than half of the funds raised and in nearly half of them, the charities
received less than thirty percent); OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF CHARITABLE SOLICITATIONS BY COMMERCIAL FUNDRAISERS IN
CALENDAR YEAR 2009, at 1 (2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/charities/publications/2009cfr/
cfr2009.pdf (reporting that the average distribution to charities by commercial fundraisers was
less than forty-three percent of the funds raised); Lloyd H. Mayer, 'Tis the Season . . .For
Charitable Solicitation Reports?, NONPROFIT L. PROF BLOG (Dec. 15, 2009), http:/Ilawprofessors
.typepad.comlnonprofit/2009/12/tis-the-season-for-charitable.solicitation-reports.html
(summarizing reports from Massachusetts, Vermont, and Washington showing an average
payment to charities of forty-two percent or less of funds raised).
158. See United Cancer Council, 165 F.3d at 1173 ("The IRS claims that UCC . . was




funds the fundraiser received as much (or even ten times as much) as
the charity may therefore be perceived by the charity's leaders as
irrelevant because those funds never "belonged" to the charity in their
eyes. In contrast, almost any other provider of goods or services will
not be able to provide "money for nothing."159 Second, there is no
evidence of such systematic, private-benefit-resulting influence by
vendors in other contexts.
This situation suggests that the government should do more to
address the relationships of charities with fundraisers. Here, however,
the government's hands are tied by a string of Supreme Court
constitutional decisions that prohibit federal, state, or local
governments from putting limits on the percentage paid to commercial
fundraisers or even requiring such fundraisers to tell potential donors
up front how much of the proceeds are actually going to the named
charity. 160 It is for this reason that state attorneys general and the
Federal Communications Commission have been forced to resort to
public education, mandatory registration and reporting, and fraud
prosecutions. 161 The effectiveness of these measures is unclear,
particularly given the apparent continued receipt by fundraising firms
of the lion's share of contributions for a significant number of
charities. 16 2 While the Uniform Commercial Code case left open the
possibility of revoking the tax-exempt status of the charity involved
under the private benefit doctrine, more targeted tax rules or state
laws are probably constitutionally problematic given the line of
Supreme Court cases mentioned above. 16 3 Absent a change in the
constitutional case law, further government regulatory remedies for
this situation are therefore probably unavailable.
159. The one exception might be investment managers, but even they generally must pay
themselves out of their returns on the charity's funds, not out of what should be (but in the
fundraising context may not be) seen as the charity's money in the first place.
160. See Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 612-17 (2003) (summarizing this
line of cases but concluding they did not prohibit states from pursuing fraud actions based on
false or misleading charitable solicitations).
161. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND
STATE LAW AND REGULATION 372-73, 424-25 (2004) (summarizing state and FTC regulation of
charitable solicitations); Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Announces "Operation
False Charity" Law Enforcement Sweep (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2009/05/charityfraud.shtm.
162. See supra note 157.
163. See United Cancer Council, 165 F.3d at 1179-80 (noting that on remand, the United
Cancer Council's tax-exempt status might be revoked under the private benefit doctrine and
declining to prejudge those proceedings).
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4. Purchasers of Goods and Services
Charities also sell goods and services in the marketplace and,
in some instances, are almost wholly dependent on the fees paid by
purchasers of these goods and services. With respect to activities that
are considered inherently charitable, such as providing education and
health care (the latter subject to certain conditions), charities are
permitted to charge full market value with few if any conditions, in
which case the potential influence of purchasers over the charity must
be considered. Outside of these activities, however, the influence of
purchasers is much more limited because these sales are generally
considered charitable only if provided to an identified charitable class
(which can consist of other charities) at charges that are no more than
"substantially below cost," a term that the IRS has indicated means at
least eighty-five percent below cost. 164 As discussed previously, the
distinction between services-and it is almost always services-that
are inherently charitable and services that are not appears to be based
on a determination by either Congress or the Treasury Department
that certain services provide a more than incidental public benefit
even when purchased by consumers at fair-market-value prices.
Besides education and health care, other, more limited examples are
providing some types of services to certain groups, specifically children
and the elderly. 165 In both instances the charging of fair-market-value
164. See Rev. Rul. 71-529, 1971-2 C.B. 234 (noting that by performing a given function for a
charge that is "substantially below cost, the organization is performing a charitable activity
within the meaning of section 501(c)(3)"); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-32-027 (May 15, 2008).
165. With respect to children, Congress has declared that providing child care will be
considered educational within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) as long as the services are
available to the general public and the care is provided for purposes of enabling individuals to be
gainfully employed. See I.R.C. § 501(k) (2006); see also David M. Blau & H. Naci Mocan, The
Supply of Quality in Child Care Centers, 84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 483, 483 (2002) ("Arguments for
government intervention in the child care market are often based on the externalities generated
by exposing children to high-quality care."); Anne E. Preston, Efficiency, Quality, and Social
Externalities in the Provision of Day Care: Comparisons of Nonprofit and For-Profit Firms, 4 J.
PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 165, 165 (1993) ("[D]ay-care services generate social externalities such
as care and education of children and labor productivity of young women."). With respect to the
elderly, the IRS has ruled that providing retirement community services to the elderly will be
considered charitable as long as such services meet three primary needs: housing, health care,
and financial security. Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 C.B. 145; see also Elizabeth C. Kastenberg &
Joseph Chasin, Elderly Housing, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FY 2004 (2003), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicgO4.pdf; David A. Brennan, The Commerciality Doctrine as
Applied to the Charitable Tax Exemption for Homes for the Aged: State and Local Perspectives, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 847 (2007) (arguing that the restrictions imposed by the IRS ruling
represent an application of the commerciality doctrine-i.e., whether the manner of providing
such services is sufficiently distinguishable from the provision of such services by for-profit
entities-as opposed to an implementation of the public benefit requirement). But see Rev. Rul.
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fees is permitted. Perhaps not surprisingly, in these five areas-health
care, education, retirement communities, day care, and physical
fitness-there are also significant numbers of for-profit and
government providers, although the percentage of providers of each
type varies significantly between these areas.
166
For services and goods that do not fall into any of these
categories, a charity may still charge consumers more than
substantially-below-cost fees, but the activity will usually be
considered an unrelated trade or business, and its net income will be
subject to federal (corporate) income tax.167 Classification as an
unrelated trade or business often also causes the loss of other benefits
normally enjoyed by charities, including access to tax-exempt bond
financing for facilities used in that trade or business and real property
tax exemption for such facilities. 168 If an unrelated trade or business
activity becomes too large a part of the organization's overall
activities, then the organization's status as a charity will also be at
risk. 169 Likely for these reasons, as well as the complexity of
administering an unrelated trade or business and the possible
negative public perception such activity may generate, the vast
76-244, 1976-1 C.B. 155 (ruling that the provision of home delivery of meals to the elderly and
handicapped at the cost of the meals is charitable in a situation where the organization only
charged for the cost of the meals and charged a reduced fee or no fee depending on the recipient's
ability to pay). Another, less studied area, perhaps because it primarily involves a single group of
related charities, is the provision of fitness centers by the YMCA. See generally Burton A.
Weisbrod, The Pitfall$ of Profit$, 2 STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 40, 40-42 (2004) (warning
against pitfalls of increasing commercialization of nonprofits).
166. See Hansmann, supra note 28, at 246 (providing statistics on distribution of ownership
forms in services including health care, old-age care, child care, and education). Other possible
areas are the arts, zoos, and aquariums, although in those areas the diversity of activities makes
it less clear that charity and for-profit entities actually engage in similar activities. Moreover,
such organizations are often less reliant on fees for service than charities operating in the other
four areas. See Louis Cain & Dennis Meritt, Jr., Zoos and Aquariums, in To PROFIT OR NOT TO
PROFIT, supra note 76, at 217, 222; (providing statistics on financing mechanisms available to
zoos and aquariums); Helmut K. Anheier & Stefan Toepler, Commerce and the Muse: Are Art
Museums Becoming Commercial?, in To PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT, supra note 76, at 233, 241.
(providing statistics on revenue sources for various types of museums).
167. See I.R.C. §§ 511-513 (detailing the treatment of charitable organizations' unrelated
business income).
168. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAx-EXEMPT BONDS FOR 501(C)(3) CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS COMPLIANCE GUIDE 3 (2005) (classifying unrelated trade or business use of tax-
exempt bond-financed property as private-business use, of which only a limited amount is
allowed); see also Gallagher, supra note 33, at 7-8 (discussing divergence in tax treatment of real
estate holdings by charities used for both exempt and nonexempt purposes among states).
169. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (2010) (disqualifying an organization from charity
status if it is "organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or
business"); see also John D. Colombo, Reforming Internal Revenue Code Provisions on
Commercial Activity by Charities, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 667, 671-79 (2007) (discussing the
sometimes inconsistent interpretations of this regulation by the courts and the IRS).
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majority of charities do not engage in such activities at all. Those
charities that do engage in unrelated trade or business activities
usually ensure that they are relatively minimal, even considering the
possibility that there is significant underreporting of such activities.
170
Purchasers of these goods and services are therefore unlikely to have
much influence on charities except in rare instances.
This is not to say that the unrelated trade or business-income
tax structure is perfect or captures all of the income that it should, nor
does it say that charging fees at a rate substantially below cost is the
only way to avoid unrelated trade or business treatment. For example,
the courts have repeatedly ruled and the IRS has accepted that
religious publishing can be substantially related to the
accomplishment of charitable or religious purposes even if the
resulting publications are sold at or above cost if certain other indicia
of noncommerciality are present.1 71 These indicia include selecting
works to publish based on criteria other than potential profitability
and distributing them in a manner designed to further that purpose,
which can but is not required to include charging at or below cost.
172
That said, however, there are clearly activities that do not
require such "noncommercial" indicia to be treated as furthering
charitable or educational purposes. In these situations, where
charities are permitted to charge full market value with few if any
conditions, the influence of the purchasers must be considered. As
already noted, such items tend to be services and, most prominently
but not exclusively, education and health care. Setting aside the issue
of a single large purchaser-who, if it had substantial influence over a
charity, would be subject to the private inurement prohibition and the
170. Compare Jael Jackson, Unrelated Business Income Tax Returns, 2006, in INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN-WINTER 2010 149, 154 (2010) (reporting
14,157 unrelated trade or business income tax returns in tax year 2006 reporting $6.5 billion in
gross income for charities), with Paul Arnsberger & Mike Graham, Charities, Social Clubs, and
Other Tax-Exempt Organizations, 2007, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME
BULLETIN-Fall 2010 169 (noting that there were 313,121 charity annual returns in tax year
2007 reporting $1.4 trillion in gross revenue).
171. See, e.g., Presbyterian & Reformed Publ'g Co. v. Comm'r, 743 F.2d 148, 158-59 (3d Cir.
1984) (reversing revocation of tax-exempt status for appellant because increased business due to
increased popularity of publisher's author did not show substantial nonexempt purpose); Pulpit
Resource v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 594, 612-13 (1978) (holding that petitioner qualifies as an exempt
organization, the robust nature of its publishing business notwithstanding, because it was
organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes). See generally Internal Revenue
Service, IRC 501(c)(3) Organizations and Publishing Activities, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FY 1988 (1987),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopice88.pdf (discussing the circumstances under
which religious publishing may be considered substantially related to the accomplishment of
charitable or religious purposes).
172. Internal Revenue Service, supra note 171, at 9-12.
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intermediate sanctions rules discussed previously-the issue raised by
these consumers is whether they pose any risk to the public benefit
commitment of charities that rely heavily on their payments. Given
the growth of reliance by charities on such consumers, documented in
the next Part, this is an important concern. This concern is also
difficult to dismiss both because it is generally accepted that in most
markets consumer demands affect the behavior of producers-a
manifestation of the famous "invisible hand"-and because it is not
clear that consumers from charities, such as hospital patients and
school students (and their parents), desire the charities with which
they interact to produce public benefits as opposed to private benefits
for those consumers. The extent of this influence is uncertain,
however, for a variety of reasons detailed in the next Part.
III. THE RISKS TO AUTONOMY FROM FEE-FOR-SERVICE CHARITY
This Part explores the potential influence of consumers on
charities, first by noting the growing reliance of charities on fees for
services generally and especially in certain areas, and second by
considering if and under what conditions such reliance could lead to
consumer desires pulling a charity away from providing public benefit.
A. The Growing Reliance by Charities on Fees from Consumers
One of the most dramatic historical trends for charities is the
growing reliance on fees for service as a source of revenue. While the
conventional wisdom is that charities rely primarily on private
donations, this has not been the case for many decades. In fact, no
major category of charities other than international organizations,
private foundations, and probably religious congregations now relies
for a majority of its financial support on private contributors. As of
2005, payments for services constituted almost seventy percent of
total revenues for charities, while private donations and government
grants were only a little over twenty percent. 173 While these figures do
not include the value of services donated to charities, which is
significant, existing data indicates that the incidence of volunteer
service has a rough correlation with the incidence of financial
contributions. 174
173. KENNARD T. WING ET AL., THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 2008, at 146 (2008).
174. See CORP. FOR NAT'L & CMTY. SERV., VOLUNTEERING IN AMERICA 2010: NATIONAL,
STATE, AND CITY INFORMATION 1 (2010), available at http://www.volunteeringinamerica.
gov/assets/resources/IssueBriefFINALJunel5.pdf (noting a significant rise in volunteering
activity nationwide in 2009); WING, supra note 173, at 34, 89, 97; Lester M. Salamon & S.
[Vol. 65:1:51
2012] THE "INDEPENDENT" SECTOR 105
These figures mask significant variations between different
types of charities and even within the same type. 17 5 For example,
health care charities, within which area hospitals control the vast
majority of revenues and assets, rely very little on private donations
(less than 2.4 percent of total revenues in 2005).176 In contrast, the
reliance of educational and human service charities is relatively close
to the sector-wide average, while arts and culture charities,
environmental charities, religious organizations, and charities that
exist primarily to support other charities have a much higher reliance
on private contributions.1 7 7 While not an exact correlation, a low
reliance on private donations and government grants generally
accompanies a high reliance on fees for services from private and
government sources, as revenue from other sources is usually
modest. 178
This reliance on fees for service is a historical shift, although
the timing and degree of that shift varies between different types of
charities.1 79 For example, the now eighty-five-percent reliance of
charity hospitals on fees is primarily a phenomena from the second
half of the twentieth century180 while the reliance of educational
Wojciech Sokolowski, Employment in America's Charities 3 (2006) (Johns Hopkins Center for
Civil Society Studies), available at http://ccss.jhu.edulwp-content/uploads/downloads
/2011/09/NEDBulletin26_2006.pdf (noting that the nonprofit sector is a larger employer than
the utility, wholesale trade, and construction industries together); Press Release, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Volunteering in the United States-2010, at 10 (2011),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/volun.pdf (noting decrease in volunteering
activities in 2010 compared with 2009).
175. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAXING THE UNTAXED SECTOR 7 (2005) (for tax-exempt
nonprofits in 2001, showing program revenue percentages ranging from ten percent to over
ninety percent depending on the primary area of activity).
176. See WING, supra note 173, at 134 (providing statistics on hospital revenues by source
between 1992 and 2005).
177. See SUSAN K. SAXON-HARROLD ET AL., AMERICA'S RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS:
MEASURING THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIETY 4 (2000) (reporting that in 1996, contributions
accounted for eighty-four percent of religious congregation revenue); WING, supra note 173, at
134 (discussing importance of contributions to religious congregation revenues); Ellen P. Aprill,
Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 844-45
(2001) (reviewing studies regarding religious congregation reliance on contributions).
178. See WING, supra note 173, at 146 (demonstrating that for all charities other than
private foundations, these other sources, including investment income, accounted for less than
ten percent of total revenues).
179. This trend is not limited to the United States. See Shaoguang Want, Money and
Autonomy: Patterns of Civil Society Finance and Their Implications, 40 STUDIES COMP. INT'L
DEV. 3, 3 (2006) (noting that reliance by charities on fees for service now exists in many
countries).
180. See Overview of the Tax-Exempt Sector: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
109th Cong. 39, 49 (2005) (statement of George K. Yin, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on
Taxation) ("Historically, charitable hospitals were characterized as voluntary because they
generally were supported by philanthropy, staffed by doctors who worked without compensation,
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institutions on fees has been more gradual and, at least
comparatively, weaker.18l For universities, private payers are not
limited to students and their parents, as consumers in the education
context include the attendees and viewers of sporting and other school
events, licensees of school-owned intellectual property, and others.
8 2
This increased reliance on fees for service leads to a plethora of
concerns. Such concerns include an undue focus by charity leaders on
economic efficiency and the bottom line, to the detriment of the
charity's mission; selection of leaders primarily for their ability to
produce profits as opposed to advancing the organization's charitable
purposes; and a lack of responsiveness to public and beneficiary
concerns. The feared effect of these numerous issues is that identified
at the end of the previous Part-reliance on such fees will detract from
providing public benefit. This abandonment of public benefit is usually
in some form of perceived degradation of the public-benefitting
activity, whether a lowering of the quality of the services provided
without reducing the fees charged or other changes to how that service
and served, almost exclusively, the sick poor."); WING, supra note 173, at 147 (noting that
"program service revenue" includes both private and government payments); Arnsberger &
Graham, supra note 170, at 174 (for health charities, reporting $697 billion in program service
revenue for tax year 2007 as compared to $801 billion in total revenue). See generally PAUL
STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982) (discussing the history and
development of the U.S. healthcare system).
181. See FREDERICK RUDOLPH, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY: A HISTORY 177-
200 (1990) (explaining that through most of the nineteenth century educational institutions
depended primarily on private contributions of money and time-particularly from low-paid
faculty-and also a significant amount of government support, while fees paid by students and
their families were modest); Arnsberger & Graham, supra note 170, at 174 (noting that
education charities reported $149 billion in program service revenue and $92 billion in
contributions, gifts, and grants for tax year 2007 as compared to $293 billion in total revenue);
Earl F. Cheit & Theodore E. Lobman, III, Private Philanthropy and Higher Education: History,
Current Impact, and Public Policy Considerations, in II RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 39, at 453,
458, 464 (1977) (showing a decreasing reliance on private contributions and increasing reliance
on public funds-including student-directed funding streams--over time); Elchanan Cohn &
Larry L. Leslie, The Development and Finance of Higher Education in Perspective, in SUBSIDIES
TO HIGHER EDUCATION: THE ISSUES 11, 18 (Howard P. Tuckman & Edward Whalen eds., 1980)
(indicating that fees from students were once modest).
182. See, e.g., Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, Universities as Creators and Retailers
of Intellectual Property: Life-Sciences Research and Commercial Development, in TO PROFIT OR
NOT TO PROFIT, supra note 76, at 169, 181-93 (describing other private payers for educational or
technological services provided by colleges and universities beyond students and their parents,
namely, consumers of intellectual property created in university settings). See generally DEREK
BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION
(2003) (discussing broad trends towards commercialization of university financial goals and
management); Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Marketing of Higher Education: The Price of the
University's Soul, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 763, 798-99 (2004) (reviewing BOK, supra, and concluding




is provided or fees are collected, such as the mix of medical services
provided, the extent of community outreach, and the aggressiveness of
bill collectors.
18 3
What tends not to be clearly identified is that this common
concern arises from the simple fact that as charities rely more and
more on the purchasers of their services (i.e., on consumers),the
collective desires of those consumers potentially gain greater influence
over charities. Even aggressive bill collection or reduced charity care
could be seen as indirectly reflecting consumer preferences because
most if not all consumers who perceive themselves as paying "full
freight" presumably are not interested in providing cross-subsidies to
other customers who either fail to pay their bills or lack the means to
do so. It is therefore not usual that charity leaders are acting in bad
faith, such as by seeking to enrich themselves-a concern that is
already addressed directly by the private inurement prohibition and
intermediate sanctions; they are simply responding to the market
reality faced by the organizations they manage. Furthermore, little
systematic attention has been paid to whether and when in fact this
potential negative outcome actually comes to pass. The remainder of
this Part considers if and when reliance on fees for service is likely to
pull a charity away from providing public benefit. As will be seen,
there are a number of factors that likely affect whether consumer
desires have this effect.
B. The Effects on Charities of Consumer Reliance
To understand both the possible influence of consumers on
charities and the limits on that influence, it is helpful to start with the
world as imagined by classical economics. In that mythical world,
where all actors have perfect information and act rationally to
maximize utility (individuals) or profits (organizations) and there are
no transaction costs, the desires of consumers would have an
immediate and direct effect on the activities of charities that rely on
the fees paid by those consumers. The only hindrance to those desires
pulling a charity away from providing public benefit, absent legal
restrictions, would then be if the consumers' desires happened to
coincide with providing public benefit. For example, if all that
consumers desired from a child care center was adequate and
efficiently provided child care, that desire would not detract a charity
that relied on those consumers from providing public-benefitting child
183. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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care. 18 4 If, however, those consumers also desired services that do not
provide public benefit, such as students (and parents) at charity
schools desiring five-star-restaurant quality food, five-star-hotel
quality dorm rooms, and a national championship football team,
responsiveness to those desires would lead charity schools to direct
some of their limited resources to providing such private benefits
instead of providing public benefits.' 8 5 Determining whether there was
a need for the law to counter consumer influence in order to ensure
that charities provide public benefits would then depend only on the
extent to which the desires of a particular charity's consumers
departed from goals that provide public benefit.
In the real world, however, such legal intervention may not be
needed even when consumers primarily desire private, not public,
benefit because there are a number of factors that could counter or
disrupt the influence of consumer desires over even a charity that is
completely reliant on the payments from such consumers. Relaxing
the assumption that consumers have perfect information, these
consumers may be unable to accurately judge whether they are in fact
receiving what they desire. For example, there is evidence in the child
care area that most parents are not very good at assessing the quality
of child care provided even though experts generally agree on how to
measure such quality.186 Therefore, even if child-care-center
consumers desire higher quality child care than would be socially
optimal for a center to provide-perhaps because providing care of the
desired quality would require charging fees that would be
unaffordable to many who need child care services-the center might
very well be unmoved by that desire since the consumers are unable to
184. See Gordon Cleveland & Michael Krashinsky, The Nonprofit Advantage: Producing
Quality in Thick and Thin Child Care Markets, 28 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 440, 441-42
(2009) (assuming parents desire high quality child care, but noting that child care markets
depart from the classical economics model in a number of important respects, including with
respect to the consumer's ability to judge quality and the fact that child care services often
operate in thin markets with little competition).
185. See Richard Arum & Josipa Riksa, Op-Ed., Your So-Called Education, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 2011, at WK10 ("[S]tudents are increasingly thought of, by themselves and their colleges, as
'clients' or 'consumers.' When 18-year-olds are emboldened to see themselves in this manner,
many look for ways to attain an educational credential effortlessly and comfortably. And they are
catered to accordingly. The customer is always right.").
186. See, e.g., Debby Cryer & Margaret Burchinal, Parents as Child Care Consumers, in
COST, QUALITY, AND CHILD OUTCOMES IN CHILD CARE CENTERS: TECHNICAL REPORT 203, 209
(Suzanne W. Helburn & Mary L. Culkin eds., 1995) (concluding that parents were impeded in
acting as well-informed consumers of child care by the difficulties of monitoring the care their
children actually received); Naci Mocan, Can Consumers Detect Lemons? An Empirical Analysis
of Information Asymmetry in the Market for Child Care, 20 J. POPULATION ECON. 743 (2007)
(arguing that a comparison of parental evaluation of quality to actual quality demonstrates that
parents are weakly rational in their judgments of quality in the U.S. child care market).
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judge whether they are in fact receiving what they want. The center
could then provide the quality of care that the center's leaders
determine best serves the community.
Similarly, a charity lacking perfect information about those
who purchase services from the charity may assume that those
purchasers' desires are consistent in all respects with the charity
providing public benefit even if they are not. For example, even if
students (and their parents) want luxurious dorm rooms, a school may
assume that their only desire is for quality education and so the school
will not shift resources away from education to residence halls.
Consumers may also not be rational utility maximizers, particularly if
utility is equated with financial well-being, but they may instead react
to all sorts of other desires, such as the desire to be associated with an
organization that has a strong reputation with respect to helping the
community (or, less positively, with winning basketball games).
Charities are not, of course, generally viewed as profit-
maximizing entities for the simple reason that no individual is able to
ultimately receive those profits. There are still certain advantages to
profitmaking for charity leaders, however, including the ability to
satisfy the commonly assumed desire to empire build.1 7 The extent to
which charity leaders seek to maximize profits even if they are unable
to directly receive those profits is therefore another relevant factor.
But empire building and similar activities may be constrained by both
inside and outside observers, whether beneficiaries, staff, the media,
government officials, or others.
Relaxing the assumption of no transaction costs with respect to
entry and exit into a particular field of activity could also result in a
number of barriers to consumer desires changing charity behavior. For
example, if a charity hospital is the only hospital within reasonable
distance for the residents of a particular geographic area and the cost
of establishing another hospital in that area is prohibitively high, the
charity hospital may be able to use its monopoly position to ignore
consumer desires. There is reason to believe that many child care
centers are in a similar position because of the limited geographic
reach of such centers, although the lack of "thick" markets for most
charity child care centers may actually reduce the ability of those
187. See Evelyn Brody, Business Activities of Nonprofit Organizations: Legal Boundary
Problems, in NONPROFITS & BUSINESS 83, 105 (Joseph J. Cordes & C. Eugene Steuerle eds.,
2009) (noting congressional concern that "empire building" could drive charity managers to
pursue profitable business endeavors).
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centers to provide public benefit through higher quality, more
efficiently provided child care.
188
Finally, other influences may counter the influence of
consumers even for a charity that relies solely on fees paid for its
services. For example, strong internal leadership may resist "catering"
to consumers to the detriment of providing public benefit. Such
resistance is potentially stronger if the leadership has access to other
sources of funds, such as private contributions or investment income,
and is not dependent on consumers. This ability to resist outside
influences is in fact one of the arguments made in support of creating
and maintaining significant endowments. 8 9 Accountability to a third
party that is not directly subject to consumer influence may also serve
as a counter.' 90 Such a third party might be an accreditation or other
standard-setting entity, or a charitable affiliate that does not rely on
income from the primary charity. For example, research with respect
to hospitals has produced at best mixed results with respect to
whether charity hospitals provide-as the contract-failure theory
predicts-higher quality care than for-profit hospitals. 191 This result
may be attributable to the common accreditation standards that apply
equally to both types of hospitals as well as to the medical
professionals who staff them. 192 In contrast, that research indicates
that for-profit and charity hospitals do often differ with respect to the
mix of services that they provide-with charity hospitals more likely
to provide services with lower or even negative profit margins-an
area that generally is not covered by hospital accreditation or
physician-licensing standards. 193 Similarly, research with respect to
child care indicates that charity child care centers are relatively
188. See Cleveland & Krashinsky, supra note 184, at 458 ("[W]hen markets are thin, demand
for high quality child care is insufficient to support quality differentiation across producers, and
nonprofits ... are generally not able to produce child care services of significantly higher quality
than in for-profits.").
189. See Henry Hansmann, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3,
29-32 (1990) (describing the history of the creation of university endowments, including original
need to self-support given divergence in some universities' religious affiliations with those of
their state legislatures, noting ongoing importance of this rationale to continued use of
endowments).
190. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Boozang, Does an Independent Board Improve Nonprofit
Corporate Governance?, 75 TENN. L. REV. 83, 117 (2007) (noting the influence of such entities on
nonprofit organizations).
191. See Schlesinger & Gray, supra note 75, at 383 (noting that empirical evidence does not
demonstrate clearly whether charity hospitals provide higher quality care than their for-profit
counterparts).
192. See id. at 393.
193. See Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 171-75
(2007).
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responsive to state regulatory demands (and more responsive than
their for-profit counterparts). 194 Significant variations in the strength
of other influences probably also exist within charities operating in
the same field. For example, religiously affiliated charities may be
subject to countervailing influences that their nonreligious
counterparts do not face. 
195
This discussion indicates that consumers collectively pulling
charities away from providing public benefit may be a real risk for
charities that rely heavily on payments from those consumers, but
that there are a number of factors that tend to counter this risk.
196
Only in the absence of such factors will it therefore be necessary to
reach the difficult-to-answer question of whether legal intervention is
required. How to address the dangers of consumer influence will
therefore vary depending on the particular circumstances faced by a
particular group of charities or even a specific charity. The next Part
explores possible options for addressing this risk, including what
considerations should generally guide choosing among these options.
IV. OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING THE RISKS OF FEE-FOR-SERVICE
CHARITY
There are several ways to address the potential consumer-
influence breach in the legal wall protecting charity autonomy
identified above. One option would be to try to eliminate the influence
of consumers entirely. Another option would be to strengthen other
influences so that they can counter consumer influence-that is,
creating a balance of power that will sufficiently restrain consumer
influence in most if not all cases. A third option, which is a refinement
of the second option, would be to require charities that rely
194. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rigby et al., Child Care Quality in Different State Policy Contexts, 26
J. POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 887, 903 (2007) (noting the "marked difference . . . in the
responsiveness to policy of nonprofit and for-profit child care centers" at the state level, with the
former being relatively more responsive).
195. See DiMaggio & Anheier, supra note 27, at 149 ("Studies that distinguish between
religious and secular [nonprofit organizations] often find systematic differences between them.");
Schlesinger & Gray, supra note 75, at 397 & n.34 (discussing the difficulty of taking religious
affiliation, which is highly correlated with nonprofit ownership, into account empirically but
noting that it has generally been found to be associated with greater accessibility for
independent patients and lower costs for hospital services).
196. See Cleveland & Krashinsky, supra note 184, at 458 ("Failure to account for
heterogeneity in market conditions faced by different nonprofit organizations is likely to deliver
a verdict that nonprofit organizations have no advantage in producing quality."); DiMaggio &
Anheier, supra note 27, at 150 (asserting that a variety of factors influence the type and extent of
differences in the behavior of nonprofits and other types of entities (public and for-profit) in the
same industry).
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significantly on fees for services to disclose additional information
about their activities to enhance the ability of both government
entities and the public to detect and counter the adverse effects of
consumer influence.
A. Eliminating Consumer Influence
Setting aside the practical and political difficulties inherent in
this choice, one option would be to bar organizations seeking to qualify
as charities from receiving payment of fair market fees for any
services (or goods), thereby eliminating consumer influence over
charities. This approach is the one taken with respect to capital
investors for all nonprofits, including charities, and therefore is not
without precedent.' 97 It also has the advantage of establishing a clear
and easily enforceable bright-line rule.
Congress and the Treasury Department have in fact already
chosen this option to a limited extent. With respect to the provision of
services or goods that are neither deemed inherently public
benefitting nor provided in such a way as to distinguish their
provision from that of for-profit entities, charities are already
prohibited from primarily engaging in these activities and are
required, generally, to pay federal (and usually state) income tax on
these sales. 198 For example, the provision of management consulting
services in exchange for fair-market-value payment, even if the
delivery of services is limited to other nonprofit organizations, does
not further a permitted purpose for a charity. 199 The sale of most types
of services and goods for fair market value absent some distinguishing
feature, such as charging substantially below cost or obtaining the
goods to be sold through donations, is therefore already barred to
charities as their primary activity and usually results in partial
withdrawal of legal benefits. 200  Congress and the Treasury
Department continue to look for other activities that should be treated
in this manner, as demonstrated by the recent rules prohibiting credit
counseling organizations from qualifying as charities if, among other
new conditions, they engage in certain activities. These activities
include providing services for the purpose of improving a consumer's
credit record, credit history, or credit rating (unless such services are
197. See supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 167, 169 and text accompanying notes 166, 167.
199. B.S.W. Grp., Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 352, 353-55, 361 (1978); Rev. Rul. 72-369, 1972-2
C.B. 245.
200. See supra note 168 and accompanying text of Part II.D.4.
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only incidental to providing credit counseling), or receiving any
amounts for providing referrals to others for debt-management plan
services .201
Both the credit-counseling example and the previous discussion
indicate, however, why this option should not be applied on a blanket
basis. Absent a situation where consumer desires both depart from
providing public benefit and have the actual effect of significantly
moving a charity away from providing public benefit, such a draconian
solution is not needed. For the reasons already discussed, neither
condition applies universally. Consumer desires may, for the most
part, align with providing public benefit, such as when consumers
primarily or solely desire an adequate and efficiently provided service
where that service inherently provides public benefit. Probably more
commonly, numerous other circumstances may ameliorate or even
eliminate the influence of consumer desires, such as market
characteristics or the influence of third parties.
The downside of choosing this option when it is not needed is
that organizations that otherwise deserve the legal benefits provided
to charities would lose a significant source of financial support as well
as the "halo" effect that comes with being a charity. As a result, such
organizations would necessarily be fewer and less able to provide
public benefits for no good reason. For example, say a nonprofit
organization is the sole hospital within reasonable driving distance for
the residents in a particular geographic area. The people in the area
are moderately well off, such that the hospital can only provide
minimal charity care-lacking poor patients-but also must keep its
fees relatively low to be affordable to the residents and so essentially
breaks even from year to year once the legal benefits it enjoys as a
charity are taken into account. The hospital is relatively immune to
consumer influences because it has a monopoly on hospital medical
care in the area. No for-profit hospital will enter this market, even
assuming low transaction costs to do so (such as if it would be
relatively inexpensive to purchase the nonprofit's facilities) because
the profit margins from serving this community are too low. 20 2 If,
however, the legal benefits are removed because the organization
201. I.R.C. § 501(q)(1)(A)(iii), (F) (2006).
202. See Marco A. Castaneda & Dino Falaschetti, Does a Hospital's Profit Status Affect Its
Operational Scope?, 33 REV. INDUS. ORG. 129, 145 (2008) (concluding that the location decisions
of not-for-profit hospitals "will fundamentally differ from the location decisions of for-profit
hospitals"). But see Jeffrey P. Ballou, Do Nonprofit and Government Nursing Homes Enter
Unprofitable Markets?, 46 ECON. INQUIRY 241, 257 (2008) (concluding that charity and for-profit
nursing homes typically enter similar markets, in contrast to government nursing homes, which
are more likely to enter unprofitable markets).
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relies exclusively on fees for service, it may be forced to close its doors,
thereby depriving this community of hospital medical care. 203 This
potential for throwing the baby out with the bathwater suggests that
in many if not most instances of possible negative consumer influence,
a more nuanced approach is more appropriate. Absent elimination of
that influence, the logical alternative would be to reduce the impact of
that influence by introducing or strengthening other influences that
push charities toward providing public benefit.
B. Counterbalancing Consumer Influence
As previously detailed, there are a number of other potential
sources of influence over charities. The influence of some of those
sources is limited under existing law because of their likelihood to
direct a charity away from providing public benefit. Other sources
have the potential to enhance or catalyze the ability of a charity to
stay true to providing public benefit even if that charity relies heavily
on fees for service.
One obvious catalyst is the government itself. The danger with
reliance on this source, however, is that, to the extent the government
curtails the specific activities in which a charity can engage, it also
curtails the ability of a charity to pursue a public-benefitting purpose
in a manner that departs from the ways that can garner sufficient
political support at that time. That is, while using government
influence to counter consumer influence is unlikely to lead to private
benefit, it does undermine one of the ways that charities operate in a
manner distinct from that of government. Also, the more that
government micromanages a charity's activities, the more a charity
comes to lose the nonbureaucratic character that is another
distinguishing feature from government.
There are, however, other possible sources of public-benefit-
seeking influence. As John Colombo and Mark Hall have developed in
detail, donors as a group may help provide that influence if they
represent a sufficient source of financial (or possibly volunteer service)
203. See generally John D. Colombo, Why We Need an Alternative to Community Benefit:
Evidence from the IRS Hospital Compliance Project Final Report, 63 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 479,
479-80 (2009) (noting that a recent IRS report concluded critical access hospitals ("CAHs"),
which provide access to health services otherwise unavailable to their surrounding community,
devoted only 2.8 percent of their revenues on average to "community benefit" because the IRS's
calculation failed to take into account the community benefit indicated by CAH status).
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support for a charity.20 4 While Colombo and Hall saw such donor
involvement as primarily signaling that a given organization in fact
provides a good or service that is subject to government and market
failures, a certain required level of donor involvement and financial
dependence by the charity could also counterbalance consumer
influence that otherwise would push the charity away from providing
public benefit.
Other possible sources can easily be imagined. There is
evidence that the existence of a third party uninfluenced by
consumers can hold a charity to account if that third party is itself
dedicated to ensuring that the charity provides public benefit. For
example, accreditation agencies may wield such authority, as
discussed previously with respect to hospitals.2 5 Similarly, a religious
body that appoints the senior leadership or has the ability to sanction
the charity may wield such influence; although, many of the existing
empirical studies do not examine whether such a characteristic affects
charity behavior.
206
Individuals other than donors can also serve as a restraining
influence. Critical employees, such as the doctors at a hospital or the
faculty at a school, may be able to prevent a charity from moving away
from providing public benefit. For example, when the leaders of the
Baptist Health System in Alabama sought to sell the system to a for-
profit company, the hospital's doctors revolted, eventually forcing out
those leaders and causing the rescission of the sale.20 7 Similarly,
faculty who are protected by tenure and academic freedom have at
times successfully challenged college and university leaders, including
with respect to perceived departures from the stated public-benefitting
mission of their school.208
204. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 13, at 113 (observing that "donations constitute a
signal by the donors that some good or service is undersupplied by both the private market and
direct government funding").
205. See supra note 192 and text accompanying notes 189-192.
206. See supra note 194-195 and accompanying text.
207. See Michael Romano, Ch-ch-ch-changes; Baptist Health Announces Restructuring Plan,
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Mar. 8, 2004, at 24; Anna Velasco, Baptist Sale Called Off- Health System
Plans Restructuring as CEO Fired, Board Chair, Others Quit, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, July 13, 2003,
at News.
208. See, e.g., Nanette Asimov & Jill Tucker, 'No Cuts, No Fees!'--Huge Walkouts Staged at
UC, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 25, 2009, at A. 1 (reporting on a walkout by University of California
faculty protesting budget cuts and layoffs), available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-09-25/bay-
area/17205252_1.protest-cuts-uc-officials-walkout. Consistent with this idea, the American
Association of University Professors includes as one of its purposes "to ensure higher education's
contribution to the common good." ABOUT THE AAUP, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY
PROFESSORS, http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/about (last visited June 29, 2011).
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One set of individuals that is usually relied upon to provide a
balancing influence, and which appears to have had limited success in
this area, is the board members and senior management of charities.
Dana Brakman Reiser has argued that group governance provided by,
at a minimum, a sufficiently large number of independent governing
body members can ensure that a charity stays true to its public-
benefit-providing mission. 20 9 It is not clear that such reliance is
justified, however, absent those individuals having some source of
authority other than simply their positions. 210 The reason for this
apparent weakness may be that whatever legal authority such
individuals have, it is insufficient in many, if not most, instances to
counter the financial influence that consumers wield given that these
leaders are also responsible for the financial well-being of the charity
(in contrast to third parties such as accreditation agencies, which
usually do not have that financial responsibility). Absent, therefore,
some source of financial influence-such as control over a significant
endowment-even independent board members may find themselves
unable to resist consumer desires. There is evidence, however, that
certain "good governance" practices, including having a more
independent board of directors, may lead to some improvements at
charities, such as improved accuracy of financial reporting.
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Given the existence of these other sources of influence and the
variation in their strengths and availability, a single blanket rule
seeking to balance interests is not available. Rather, when it is
demonstrated both that a private-benefit-seeking consumer influence
is present and that influence has at least a strong potential to
significantly change a charity's activities, consideration should be
given on an industry-by-industry basis to whether specific steps
should be taken to enhance other influences. Arguably that is what
the IRS did when it required hospitals to have both community boards
and open medical staffs, enhancing the influence of community
leaders and diluting the influence of specific groups of doctors (and
also enhancing government influence by requiring acceptance of
Medicaid and Medicare patients). That said, community boards may
209. Reiser, supra note 50, at 15-16, 43 (citing Dana Brakman Reiser, Director Independence
in the Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 795, 830 (2007) [hereinafter Reiser, Director
Independence]); see also Reiser, Director Independence, supra, at 806-07 (suggesting ways in
which independent directors might improve nonprofit organization governance).
210. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
211. See Michelle H. Yetman & Robert J. Yetman, The Effects of Governance on the
Financial Reporting Quality of Nonprofit Organizations 10-11, 37-38 (Feb. 19, 2011)




often not be enough. Consideration should therefore also be given to
requiring a certain minimal level of donor commitment-along the
lines of Colombo and Hall's approach but for a different reason than
the one on which they primarily rely-or professional-staff or third-
party involvement, when the consumer-influence risk exists.
Similarly, while the accumulation of substantial endowments
has recently been the subject of significant criticism, consideration
should be given to whether such endowments provide school board
members and other leaders with the ability to resist demands from
students/parents, for-profit licensees and joint-venture partners, and
even alums that may be inconsistent with the public-benefit-seeking
mission of the school. Finally, ways of increasing the involvement of
other parties that are likely to reinforce the pursuit of public benefit
should be considered. One specific way to increase that involvement
may be to provide such parties with more information regarding the
activities and priorities of vulnerable charities. The next Section
addresses this possible approach in more detail.
C. Monitoring Consumer Influence
Consumer, private-benefit-seeking influence could be countered
at least in part by increasing public disclosure of charity activities.
Disclosure has the advantage of not putting the government in the
position of dictating any particular activities or manner of providing
public benefit, at least not until specific problems are revealed;
although, it can create pressure to adopt certain practices.
212
Disclosure can also be targeted, either to particular types of
charities-as illustrated by the recently developed hospital schedule
for the annually required tax-exempt organization information return
(IRS Form 990)-or to charities that exceed a certain percentage of
their revenues coming from fees for services. 213 The administrative
burden created by increased disclosure requirements therefore need
not be imposed on all charities, but only a subset that is deemed to
more likely be subject to adverse consumer influence.
Disclosure also has the advantage of making information
available to a broad range of audiences that can then judge whether a
charity has succumbed to consumer influence (or, indeed, any other
adverse influences). If Congress or the IRS made such increased
212. See, e.g., Brier, supra note 136, at 37-38.
213. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, Schedule H (Form 990)




disclosure a feature of the IRS Form 990 filed by most charities of
significant size, then such information would be public not only by
operation of law but also because of the efforts of a private charity
that provides access to all such forms online for free. 214 The returns
are therefore readily available not only to the IRS but also to donors,
the media, state tax authorities and legislators, and the public
generally. Each one of these outside influences could then call the
charity to account in various ways-whether by ending financial or
service support, running critical press stories, challenging state tax
exemptions, or otherwise-if the perceived activities appear
inconsistent with providing public benefit.
There are at least two significant problems with this approach,
however, even assuming that any increased administrative burden
would not be significant and that the required disclosure is correctly
designed to elicit accurate and useful information. 21 5 First, not all
reviewers of this information would seek to ensure that charities only
provide public benefit. The media is understandably driven by its own
consumer demands, including for sensationalist stories, that might
lead it to concentrate on certain details-alleged excessive
compensation being a popular candidate-to the exclusion of other,
less headline-inducing but perhaps more serious concerns, such as the
elimination of certain medical services for which a charity is the only
source in a community. Perhaps of greater concern, opponents of a
particular charity's mission might mine such disclosures for
information that could be used to criticize a charity unfairly.
Second, and likely more importantly, disclosure itself is not
necessarily a panacea. As those who have considered the benefits and
costs of disclosure have long known, disclosure of information is not
automatically beneficial. Rather, the benefits of disclosure depend on
what information is disclosed and how that information is disclosed.
This is the case because the effects of such disclosure on the parties
making it and the utility of such disclosure to the intended audiences
depend both on the usefulness of the information to that audience and
whether the information is presented in such a fashion that it reaches
214. The nonprofit organization GuideStar gathers and makes available information about
nonprofit organizations to its clients and to the public on its website, www.guidestar.org. About
Us, GUIDESTAR, http://www2.guidestar.org/rxg/about-us/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
215. But see Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent
Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 583-97 (2005) (expressing
concerns that high implementation costs would render certain disclosure-related proposals




that audience in an understandable manner. 216  Consideration
therefore needs to be given to not only what specific information is
collected but how that information is then made available to
government agencies and to the public.21 7 While the charity-owned
GuideStar website, which posts the annual IRS filings for all tax-
exempt organizations, is a great resource, it is not clear to what extent
even savvy information gatherers, such as reporters, use this
database, much less the average member of the public.218 Similarly,
the various private charity "rating" organizations tend to cover only a
small part of the sector and reach only a small part of the public.21 9 In
part for this reason, there have been calls for public or quasi-public
information clearinghouses for charities. Particularly with respect to
charities that rely heavily on fees for services, it may be time to
develop such proposals further.
D. The Option to Avoid
Each of the above options attempts to address the cause of the
potential problem-the influence of consumers-as opposed to
addressing the symptoms-the activity that departs from providing
public benefit. This choice is deliberate. Attempting through new legal
rules to micromanage activities directly to ensure the provision of
public benefit raises at least two significant concerns. First, and as
previously discussed, 220 such micromanagement necessarily exposes
the affected charities to increased government influence, which runs
counter to one of the key aspects separating charities (as well as all
private entities) from government entities-not being captive to the
216. See id. at 598-605 (questioning whether either public or private enforcement would be
enhanced by certain disclosure-related proposals). See generally ARCHON FUND ET AL., FULL
DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 11 (2007) (concluding that effective
disclosure depends on transparency policies that are user-centered and sustainable).
217. See Reiser, supra note 215, at 607-08 (recognizing electronic filing as a more useful way
to disclose information).
218. See, e.g., 2009 GUIDESTAR, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2010), available at http://www2.
guidestar.org[ViewCmsFile.aspx?ContentID=3092 (reporting only 307,000 subscribers for its free
newsletter).
219. See, e.g., 2009 BBB Wise Giving Alliance Annual Report, BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU
http://www.bbb.org/us/2009-bbb-wise.giving-alliance-annual-report/ (last visited June 29, 2011)
(indicating that the Wise Giving Alliance made "over 1,200" reports about national charities);
Frequently Asked Questions, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PHILANTHROPY,
http://www.charitywatch.org/faq.html (last updated Apr. 5, 2011) (indicating that the American
Institute of Philanthropy's Charity Rating Guide grades "over 500 major American charities");
Overview, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay-content.
view&cpid=628 (last visited June 29, 2011) (evaluates "over 5,000 of America's best-known
charities").
220. See supra notes 15, 66 and accompanying text.
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politically popular will. Charities can, of course, choose to align
themselves with the politically popular will by collaborating with
governments, including through receiving government funding for
activities, but that is a voluntary surrender of autonomy, not a
mandate. Such choices, as well as the choice by governments to
provide public funding for a particular activity, raise their own issues,
but those issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
Second, such micromanagement can easily have unintended
consequences that may actually reduce the public benefit provided.
For example, in the retirement community context, the choice by the
IRS to require a nonexpulsion policy for elderly residents to ensure
their need for financial stability is met may have had the effect of
charities actually imposing more rigorous financial requirements on
potential residents than comparable for-profit entities because
charities face the prospect of having to provide for such residents until
the end of their lives, even if they become destitute.221 Similarly, a
common criticism of proposed, bright-line charity-care requirements
for charity hospitals is that such requirements will lead to hospitals
abandoning other worthwhile and perhaps greater public-benefit-
generating activities-such as community outreach efforts, the
provision of low-profit or loss-generating medical services, and medical
education and research-in order to free up sufficient resources to
satisfy the charity-care requirement. 222 There is also a risk that such a
requirement imposes a maximum as well as a minimum, perhaps
leading in at least some instances to an actual reduction in the
amount of charity care a particular charity hospital provides. In the
child care area there is significant evidence that unobserved, and
hence difficult or impossible-to-mandate factors, such as the
enthusiasm and dedication of staff that a nonprofit may be able to
engender, affect the quality of child care provided. 223 It therefore is
more advisable to directly counter the influence of consumers.
221. See Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 C.B. 145; Schlesinger & Gray, supra note 75 at 383, 385
(tbl.16.1 (finding that for-profit nursing homes generally provide better access for unprofitable
patients based on Medicaid admissions).
222. See Jessica Berg, Putting the Community Back into the "Community Benefit" Standard,
44 GA. L. REV. 375, 387-429 (2010) (recognizing this problem and proposing a more nuanced
regulatory mandate in response).
223. See, e.g., David M. Blau, The Production of Quality in Child-Care Centers: Another Look,





Careful consideration of the various theories that seek both to
explain the role of charities and to justify their receipt of significant
legal benefits reveals the distinct characteristics of charities as
compared to other types of organizations, including their limitation to
purposes that provide public benefit, broadly speaking. Ensuring that
charities have these characteristics in turn requires that charities
enjoy limited autonomy from individuals and other types of
organizations, including governments. Current law for the most part
provides this needed but limited autonomy, carefully balancing the
influence of governments, other nonprofit-sector actors, families, and
market actors. In one key respect, however, current law fails, as it
does not adequately restrain the potential adverse influence of
consumers on charities that rely heavily on fees for services. While
several options exist for remedying this gap in existing law, choosing
the correct option for any given charity activity or specific charity
requires careful consideration of whether this potential adverse
influence is likely to be realized.
There are several further avenues for research that these
conclusions suggest. First, the existing empirical research relating to
charities that rely heavily on fees for service and whether they in fact
operate differently than their for-profit counterparts needs to be
systematically reviewed and supplemented as needed. Only once this
is done can it be determined whether consumer influence over such
charities in fact needs to be countered, and which of the various
countermeasures available is most appropriate. Furthermore, such a
review and expansion can test the accuracy of the theoretical
assertions made here. While this Article has cited some of this
research for illustrative purposes, and there has been a recent
comprehensive review of such research with respect to health care and
nursing home charities, further work is needed with respect to the
education and child care fields and with the risk of consumer influence
specifically in mind.
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Second, the analysis of existing law in Part II identified several
other situations where gaps may exist in current legal protections of
charity autonomy or, alternatively, where protection may exist that is
not necessary. These situations involved the influence of controlling
family members, of controlling mutual benefit nonprofits, and of
224. See Schlesinger & Gray, supra note 75, at 378 (identifying more than 210 empirical




commercial fundraisers, as well as the possible unnecessary
limitations on lobbying by charities. While each of these concerns is
relatively minor as compared to the more significant concern of
consumer influence, they are still deserving of greater scrutiny and
consideration.
Third and less directly on point, there is evidence indicating
that both government and the market can effectively "crowd out"
charities when the previously identified government and market
failures lessen or disappear.22 If such an ability can be confirmed
empirically, then the laws setting the boundaries between charities on
one hand and the government and the market on the other hand are
primarily needed not to keep charities out of these other sectors but to
protect charities from the influence of actors in those other sectors.
Such research could also identify situations where the law may
inadvertently hamper the ability of governments or the market to step
into areas of weakening government or market failures.
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While balancing various influences correctly is difficult, it will
often be more politically feasible and effective to engage in such
balancing instead of trying to simply prohibit a particular source of
influence. That certainly appears to be true with respect to most
charities that rely heavily on fees for services, for which the solution
in the vast majority of situations should not be to prohibit such
reliance but to offset whatever negative influence such reliance grants
to consumers. By doing so, we can reduce or eliminate the harm that
consumers of such services otherwise cause to charities and their
public-benefitting missions without unnecessarily ending the
provision of needed legal benefits to current charities that are in fact
providing significant public benefit.
225. See supra notes 67, 76-77 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Hallstrom, supra note 76, at 665-66 (describing how a legislative change that
permitted student-loan charities to convert to for-profit status without having to repay back
taxes on previously issued tax-exempt bonds opened the door to such conversions).
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